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As a child, I especially enjoyed reading Aesop's Fables, which
challenged my thinking about rather ordinary but universal lessons of
life. One particular fable is called "The Astrologer" and tells of a
man who believes he could read the future in the stars. The man
spends his time gazing at the sky until one day, while his eyes were
fixed upward, he abruptly sinks into a hole, which he soon discovers is
filled with mud and water. His cries for help are heeded by the
villagers who pull him out of the mud, prompting one of them to
chide, "You pretend to read the future in the stars, and yet you fail to
see what is at your feet. This may teach you to pay more attention to
what is right in front of you."1 The tale had long since faded from my
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1. THE AESOP FOR CHILDREN (Checkerboard Press 1919) (1689).
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memory until relatively recently while speaking with a group of
pediatricians at Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We
were discussing the growing quandary surrounding the role of
adolescents in medical decision-making, remarking on the dearth of
definitive legal guidelines other than the age-old formality that
anyone under 18 years of age is presumed to lack decisional ability (as
if on one's 18th birthday an enormous epiphany occurs)2 and how a
lack of attention to the area of adolescent decision-making raises
serious moral, ethical, medical, and legal concerns. It was then that I
had an epiphany of my own, being reminded of the ageless lesson of
Aesop's Fable and reflecting how the current state of law and public
policy governing adolescence was very much like the Astrologer who
focuses all of his attention upward while ignoring, to his detriment,
what was below him.
The conundrum of adolescent autonomy reverberates beyond
pediatric offices and hospitals, generating uncertainty, especially
among those who regularly deal with adolescents. The crux of the
conundrum is decisional capability, a complex concept that eludes
precise definition. At best, it is defined as the ability to "perform a
task," entailing an ability to understand information, deliberate, and
decide In contrast to adults, who are presumed decisionally capable,
minors are presumed incapable by law. With regard to adolescents
2. Of course, this epiphanous phenomenon is neither unique to my observation nor
exclusive to the law of the United States. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CHILDREN AND
ADOLECENTS: PROTECTION WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CHARTER (1996). See also
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 n.12 (1979) (noting that "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority" (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976))); Action for
Children's TV v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (observing that "[w]hile a child's
ability to make decisions is presumed to be inferior to an adult's, the capacity for choice
does not remain dormant throughout childhood until appearing ex nihilo upon the arrival
of a person's 18th birthday"); Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (W.D. Mich. 1977)
(acknowledging that "[t]here is no magic age at which a person reaches maturity-some
persons unfortunately never do"). Accord John Pearce, Consent to Treatment During
Childhood: The Assessment of Competence and Avoidance of Conflict, 165 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 713,713 (1994).
3. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCILES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 133-38 (4th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1979). A "thicket of variables" is how
Willard Gaylin has described it. See Willard Gaylin, The Competence of Children: No
Longer All or None, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33,35 (1982). Other commentators have
likened a single test of competency to "a search for a Holy Grail." See Loren H. Roth et
al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279,283 (1977).
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(approximately 14 through 17 years), this legal presumption is
problematic for a host of reasons.
Foremost, social norms that are closely allied with governing law
treat adolescents as though they are decisionally capable, producing a
kaleidoscope approach to adolescent rights with endless variegated
exceptions and circuitous results. For example, a 15-year-old may
decide medical treatment for a sexually transmittable disease but may
not decide treatment for a complication related to the STD. Or, a 16-
year-old, who is presumed incapable of deciding a surgical procedure
for herself is nonetheless presumed capable to decide a medical
procedure for her infant child. Further examples of anomalous
results abound, such as when a 17-year-old may confront a criminal
conviction with punitive and retributive sanctions, including the death
penalty, but is deemed incapable to refuse life-sustaining treatment.4
While the divisive issue of adolescent violence has captured the
collective conscience, the visceral response of statutory amendments
expediting the transfer of adolescent offenders to adult criminal court
for categorically delineated crimes is deficient to the overall task of
constructing a cohesive model for legal governance of adolescence.
Because these statutes glaringly omit the core consideration of
decisional capability, notably whether an adolescent suspect possesses
the capacity to stand trial as an adult, this treatment of adolescents is
not only contradictory but fundamentally unfair. It seems the only
thing fair about the current legal approach to adolescence is to say
that it remains a stagnant enclave in law and policy, suffering not so
much from benign as serial neglect. The rules that result from
presumptive decisional incapacity "meander like a restless wind
inside a letter box, tumbling blindly"5 as they inadequately address
adolescent issues.
Paradoxically, the United States Supreme Court has held society
to a "high duty" to ensure that adolescents develop into meaningful
participants in their own lives and hence society, while also declaring
that vulnerability and mature decision-making inability justifies a
presumption of decisional incapacity, despite a quarter century of
4. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); In re Application of Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
5. JOHN LENNON & PAUL MCCARTNEY, ACROSS THE UNIVERSE (EMI Blackwood
Music Inc. 1968).
6. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 636. See also Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061
(2000) (reiterating the tenet that minors lack "maturity, experience, and capacity for
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mounting scientific and developmental research that contradicts the
Supreme Court's declaration. Remarkably, a paucity of scientific and
social science evidence legitimates presumptive decisional incapacity.7
This impoverished legal approach toward adolescence is especially
striking because acknowledging individual autonomy fosters self-
determination and self-confidence by cultivating an important sense
of responsibility and accountability, not only to oneself but to others.
Furthermore, the lack of evidentiary foundation to sustain
presumptive decisional inability arguably encroaches on adolescent
legal rights in a way that closely parallels the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions8 by restricting the exercise of legal rights
based upon factual distortions. Essentially, presumptive decisional
incapacity disables recognition of adolescent rights, despite the
Supreme Court's pronouncement that the federal Constitution is not
for adults alone.9 Unless legal policy makers are able to assert other
substantial or compelling reasons for denying autonomous decision-
making for adolescents, presumptive decisional incapacity warrants
thorough examination. It potentially lacks even a rational basis and,
thus, presents possible problems of constitutional proportion. Due to
these important implications impacting adolescent legal rights,
counsel representing adolescent clients may have an ethical duty to
frame and advocate the issues with support from multidisciplinary
evidence. Failure to do so may constitute legal malpractice under the
logic of Justice William Brennan's reproach with respect to issues of
state constitutional character."
No less illustrious is the fundamental realization that adolescents
are a vital segment of the United States populace, envisaged as
contributing members of a democratic citizenry with autonomous
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions" (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 602 (1978))); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 672 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (justifying legal nonaccountability for adolescents because they
"lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment").
7. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., No PLACE To Go: THE CvIL CoMMITMENT OF
MINORs 3 (Univ. of Neb. Press 1998). See also Gary B. Melton, Judicial Notice of 'Facts'
about Child Development, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACr OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH 232,238-39 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987).
8. For the seminal discussion of the doctrine and how it relates to various areas from
individual rights to corporate privilege, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
9. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
10. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,502 (1977).
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lives deserving of decency and dignity. As with laws tailored to the
realities and needs of an aging population, one may scarcely imagine
a more worthwhile populace deserving special attention than those
coming of age and, thereby, fashion legal rules that do not falter when
juxtaposed with factual and empirical evidence of adolescent
capability. Accordingly, the state as parens patriae has an interest in
promoting the self-determination and self-esteem of emerging adults
within adolescents. Presumptive decisional incapacity damages the
life-long development of decision-making ability and the state as
parens patriae should recognize and cultivate adolescent decisional
ability.
In this Article, I urge a paradigmatic shift in thinking about
adolescence that entails a legal framework predicated on adolescent
decisional ability. Approaching adolescence from the standpoint of
decisional ability, rather than presumptive decisional incapacity,
comports with contemporary social norms, encourages clear rules in
contrast to convoluted exceptions, and optimizes development for
meaningful adolescent decision-making. In this regard, a President's
Commission for the Study of Adolescence should be established as an
important first step toward devoting national attention to adolescent
decisional issues that would shape policy debate and, thereby, fulfill
the "high duty" directive by the Supreme Court. The adolescent
autonomy model that I am advancing envisions national recognition
of adolescence as a distinct legal category, meriting particularized
policy consideration of adolescent decisional issues in an array of
contexts. I also propose that the United States Congress consider
enacting legislation addressing adolescence that enables states to
further national policy through carefully considered statutes and
regulations, establishing the scope of adolescent decision-making in
various contexts. Indeed, throughout this Article, I attempt to
illustrate why presumptive decisional incapacity pervading present
legal governance necessitates both reconceptualization and revision.
That the concept of decisional capacity both enables and disables
the exercise of legal rights is illuminated by the writings of Professor
Katherine Hunt Federle, who describes the confining component of
capacity as a "blinder," which "narrows our field of vision; we cannot
broaden our perspective until we acknowledge the ways in which
capacity suppresses choice, slights interests, and inhibits growth."1
11. Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A
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However, unlike Professor Federle's proposal to "cast capacity aside
as an organizing principle,"'12 I maintain that decisional capacity is an
appropriate locus for an adolescent autonomy model that will
respond to adolescent issues without eliminating parens patriae that
allows states flexibility to formulate rules that have traditionally
distinguished a juvenile justice system. Lest my argument be
interpreted to de-emphasize the extraordinary role of family or other
social institutions in the development of adolescents, allow me to
assuage concerns by clarifying that an adolescent autonomy model
premised on decisional ability will not negate the beneficial guidance
provided by these institutions, but would clarify the law while
encouraging involvement of trusted adults in the lives of adolescents. 3
Moreover, the Supreme Court has resolved that "minors are not
beyond the protection of the Constitution," 4 with constitutional
scholars observing that a "minor's constitutional rights warrant no
less respect than those of adults." 5 Accordingly, a further level of
exploration, though beyond the scope of this Article, is whether
adolescent decisional capability is commensurate with adults 6 and, if
so, whether adolescent constitutional rights should be elevated to
fundamental stature along with those afforded adults.
The thesis of my Article is that autonomous decisional ability
should be the cornerstone for a coherent legal model governing issues
Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983, 1022 (1993).
12- Id. at 1028.
13. A study published in the Archives of Pediatric Adolescent Medicine found that
adolescents emphasized the importance of trusted adults in their lives, which researchers
report is associated with reducing risky behavior of adolescents. Sharon R. Beier et al.,
The Potential Role of an Adult Mentor in Influencing High-Risk Behavior in Adolescents,
154 ARCIVES OF PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 327 (2000).
14. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,632 (1979).
15. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1344 (2d ed. 1988).
16. Studies that have examined adolescent decisional capability employ criteria
generally used to evaluate adult decisional capacity. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas
Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1635 (1988) (discussing criteria used in decisional capacity assessments). Although beyond
the scope of this Article, there should be empirical testing regarding the appropriate
criteria by which to accurately measure adolescent decision-making ability and whether
those criteria differ in kind, but not in result, from adults. As Frances J. Lexcen and N.
Dickon Reppucci observe, "instruments designed to assess adult competence are a valid
inclusion, but, if they are used alone, they might be insufficient for a full description of
adolescent capacity." Frances J. Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of
Psychopathology on Adolescent Medical Decisionmaking, 5 U. CH. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 63, 105 (1998).
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of adolescence. Providing background and context for the current
state of the law, Part I traces a century's evolution of legal treatment
toward adolescence, a historical heritage that segues into Part II,
wherein I examine adolescent decisional capacity in a contemporary
context. Part II is subdivided to include insular arenas of law,
including family, contract, tort, juvenile delinquency, health care, end-
of-life decision-making, mental health treatment and civil
commitment, medical experimentation, genetic testing, organ
transplantation, and procreative choice. While each legal arena
presents distinct issues and challenges for adolescent rights, together
they explicate the vista of rules that ineffectively resolve adolescent
issues. These sections also highlight literature germane to adolescent
decisional capacity and cognitive ability. Part III elucidates a
comprehensive approach to adolescent autonomy, which would
enhance the development of legal policy governing adolescence.
I. Adolescence in Historical Context
Twentieth century legal treatment of adolescence reflects a
serendipitous sojourn, which prompted Margaret Mead to lament the
lack of enthusiastic attention devoted to adolescence as "something
that one took for granted, a figure of speech, a mythological subject
rather than a subject of articulate scrutiny.' '17 Inarticulate scrutiny
perhaps best characterizes adolescence, as published empirical
studies, along with legal decisions and commentary discussing
adolescence, did not appear until the last quarter of the century.
"Adolescenthood," as a field of study, is absent from much of
academic scholarship discussing "childhood and adulthood."18 The
study of adolescence lacks even extensive literary treatment, which
would provide a distinct adolescent perspective to enhance our
understanding, 9 as literature is thought to lend humanistic insight into
17. Margaret Mead, Theoretical Setting-1954, in CHILDHOOD IN CONTEMPORARY
CULTURES 3 (Margaret Mead & Martha Wolfenstein eds., 1955).
18. See DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 36-37 (Routledge
1993).
19. Other than J.D. Salinger's fictional perspective of Holden Caufield in CATCHER IN
THE RYE published in 1945, the nonfictional DIARY OF ANNE FRANK published in 1947,
and John Knowles' portrayal of Devon school chums Gene and Phineas in the 1959
publication of A SEPARATE PEACE, a rich and distinct adolescent perspective is notably
absent from much of the twentieth century literary scene.
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complex social, psychological and legal issues.' As Guido Calibresi
and Philip Bobbitt suggest, "The people we are, the people we have
become, will direct the terms of future discussions, even as these in
turn shape us."21  Certainly, our discourse and treatment of
adolescence immeasurably reflect the mores of our social structure
and shapes generations of society.
Essentially, legal treatment of adolescence has been shaped by
the establishment of the juvenile justice system, the crafting of parens
patriae, and jurisprudence balancing the interests of parents, state,
and youth. Adolescents were erstwhile cast without rights, regarded
as property or chattels of parents, and captive to the peculiarities and
particularities of family environments. They were put to work in
fields or mines for endless hours or subjected to abuse at home-all of
which was completely within the family sphere. Even during the
Salem witchcraft trials of 1692 Puritan New England, the circle of
adolescent witch-mongers largely responsible for the false allegations
and tragic executions of nearly twenty innocent people during that
fateful summer, were not punished by the state but left to parental
discretion. When adolescents were thought wayward or incorrigible,
they were subjected to brute punishment by either their parents or
the religious community. Later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, they were socialized to almshouses, asylums, and
apprenticeships. In the mid-1800's, children's rights renegade
Dorothea Dix-a kindred spirit to her twentieth century counterpart,
Jane Addams-rallied for a more humanistic view of youth and a
measure of dignity for adolescents by forging the establishment of
reformatories for wayward youth that culminated in the 1899 passage
of the first juvenile court act by the state of Illinois. This demarcated
a distinct legal system to address the specific needs of children and
adolescents. This new legal system dealt largely with offenses based
on status alone."
20. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1998).
21. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOIcEs 168 (1978). See also
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 77 (1859) (stating that the "existing generation is
master both of the training and the entire experience of the generation to come").
22. Although status offenses, including incorribility, immoral conduct, and disregard
for parental authority, are still reflected in numerous state statutes, truancy, alcohol and
drug related acts, curfew violations, and repeated delinquent acts by a child under ten
routinely garner attention by the juvenile justice system. See CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 1787(a) (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2 (11) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-23-
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By the early part of the twentieth century, each state had enacted
a version of the Illinois act, ensconced in paternalistic recognition that
the state may justifiably intercede into family life in order to protect
the health and welfare of a vulnerable segment of the population-
children and adolescents-and deter those "treading the downward
path." Then, as now, the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system
hinged upon age (i.e., age, rather than the act conferred juvenile court
jurisdiction). The goal of the paternalistic policy underlying juvenile
jurisdiction regarding a disobedient youth was to "take him in charge,
not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not
to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy
citizen. 24 Referred to as parens patriae, this policy, stemming from
English feudal law, sought to promote the well being of its citizenry.
Deeply entrenched in this concept is a morality requiring the
respectful treatment of others and an ethos that "physically, mentally,
and morally"' benefits disempowered persons. This concept is richly
reflected in the benevolence of law, i.e., disposition to act for the
benefit of another, and the ethical principle of beneficence, i.e.,
102(3)(b)(i) (1999). Other states include handgun possession, billiard room loitering, and
theater admission by false identification as status offenses. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-12-109.5 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-6605 (8) (Law. Co-op. 1999). Moreover,
several bills introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives to reduce
juvenile crime and ensure increased accountability of juvenile offenders recommend
renewed attention to status offenses and rehabilitation programs for minors who commit
them. See, eg., Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1999, S. 993, 106th
Cong. (1999) (introduced May 10, 1999 as an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968); H.R. 1150, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced March 17, 1999
to amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Protection Act of 1974). While status
offenses promise rehabilitation, prosecutors demonstrate a troubling tendency to use
evidence of a juvenile's status offenses to justify certification for adult criminal court.
Nathaniel Abraham's case underscores this dilemma. During the certification
proceedings, prosecutors in Michigan offered into evidence Nathaniel's previous status
offenses, which had been largely, if not altogether, neglected by the legal system, despite
repeated requests from Nathaniel's family for rehabilitative treatment. See 20/20: He's
Only a Child. Should An 11-Year-Old Be Tried As An Adult? (ABC television broadcast,
Feb. 13, 1998) (describing 11-year-old Nathaniel Abraham as the "poster child for the
crackdown on juvenile crime" and as "one of the youngest in the United States to be tried
as an adult for murder"); Adult Murder Trial for Boy 11, CmH. TRB., Nov. 4,1999, at 3.
23. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104,107 (1910).
24. Id.
25. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401 (1923).
26. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(stating that the law's reflection of public policy "is shaped with a view to the benefit of
the nation as a whole").
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moral obligation to act for the benefit of others.' Accordingly, parens
patriae is poised for laws governing persons thought vulnerable within
the populace, most notably youthful and senior citizens.
Occupying a stalwart post in the newly established juvenile
justice system during the turn of the twentieth century, the spirit of
parens patriae was summarized by Julian Mack in his classic statement
about the juvenile court published in 1910:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a
criminal;... to take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and
then reforming it, to protect it from the stigma,-this is the work
which is now being accomplished by dealing even with most of the
delinquent children through the court that represents the parens
patriae power of the state, the court of chancery. Proceedings are
brought to have a guardian or representative of the state appointed
to look after the child, to have the state intervene between the
natural parent and the child because the child needs it, as evidenced
by some of its acts, and because the parent is either unwilling or
unable to train the child properly.?
A large measure of parens patriae influenced the twentieth
century's federal and state compulsory education and child labor
legislation. The acts originated from "common humanitarian
instincts"29 and were primarily concerned with the conditions to which
children were exposed during the industrial age, a time when
adolescents were deployed to factories, mills, and mines for long
hours.30
In a series of decisions beginning in the early 1920's, the United
States Supreme Court engaged in a social ordering, which solidified
the place of parens patriae while preserving parental authority in the
lives of children and adolescents. However, the Court's linear
analysis with parens patriae at one end and parental authority at the
other was remiss by not reserving a formidable position for the
27. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 260.
28. Mack, supra note 23, at 109.
29. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,227 (1972).
30. Progressive physicians during this period "advocated reform of labor practices to
provide leave for pregnant women and less dangerous work environments for children.
By 1910, trauma had surpassed infectious disease as the leading cause of death for children
between 5 and 14 years of age." Robert L. Martensen, The Emergence of the Science of
Childhood, 275 JAMA 649, 649 (1996). Dr. Martensen further states that "[i]n the
southern textile mills that developed after the Civil War, one third of the workers were
children between 10 and 13 years of age." Id.
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individuality of children, particularly adolescents. This early
analytical framework led to decisions spotlighting both the right of
parents to raise children and the state's ability to protect their "life,
health, comfort, and welfare"3 that upstage the adolescents at center
stage.
In an opinion delivered by Justice McReynolds, the Court parsed
the parameters of state and parental authority. In 1923, the Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska constitutionally invalidated a Nebraska statute
that proscribed the teaching of any language other than English.32
Revering education and the acquisition of knowledge, the Court
upbraided the state's arbitrary attempt to impinge on "the natural
duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their
station in life"'33 while failing to discern any peril "to the health,
morals, or understanding of the ordinary child" by becoming
proficient in the German language.34 In 1924, the Court declared
Oregon's Compulsory Education Act of 1922 an unreasonable
interference "with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children." 35 Delineating proper from
improper use of state power, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters
reasoned that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."
Twenty years after Pierce, the Court in Prince v. Massachusetts
upheld a Massachusetts child labor law proscribing parental
permission for a minor to sell or offer for sale any newspapers,
magazines or parcels on any street or in a public place.37 Sarah Prince
had other ideas. A Jehovah's Witness, Sarah permitted her children
to sell and disperse religious literature on street comers, despite
warnings by state officials that she was violating the law.38 Writing on
behalf of the majority, Justice Rutledge refuted Sarah's claims that
the law unduly restricted her parental authority and religious
31. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,395 (1923).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 400.
34. Id. at 403.
35. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925).
36. Id. at 535.
37. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
38. See id. at 161-62.
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freedom, and emphasized that the state as parens patriae may narrow
parental authority by "limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare," including "matters of conscience
and religious conviction."39 Nearly thirty years later, however, Chief
Justice Burger delivered an opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which
invalidated a Wisconsin statute compelling school attendance beyond
the eighth grade as it applied to the Amish community, proclaiming it
an unjustified interference with parental religious freedom.4°
Attempting to disentangle the conflicting state and parental interests,
Chief Justice Burger resisted "a parens patriae claim of such all-
encompassing scope and with such sweeping potential,"'" finding the
record devoid of any physical or mental harm to minors, and afforded
Amish parents the "opportunity to make an intelligent choice
between the Amish way of life and that of the outside world. 4 2 What
is most disturbing about the Chief Justice's reasoning is the singular
focus on the parents' religious choices and convictions while ignoring
the autonomy and individual interests of the adolescents involved.
Indeed, the Chief Justice disregards points by both the concurring and
dissenting opinions that allude to the state's legitimate interest in
preparing adolescents for a self-chosen lifestyle that may differ from
that of their parents." Only Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion
reminds us of the vital interests not considered-the views of
adolescents who are persons within the Bill of Rights and who have
distinct protectable interests.4' Chastising the Court for imperiling
their future, Justice Douglas would have adolescents decide their own
preferred life course because it is this judgment, not the parents',
"that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said
about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of
their own destiny." 5 Underlying Justice Douglas' recognition of the
39. See id. at 166-67. Recognizing the parens patriae power of the state to restrict the
province of parental control, the Court in Prince nonetheless reaffirmed its cardinal view
that "the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." Id. at 166.
40. 406 U.S. 205,231 (1972).
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id at 230, 232.
43. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
44. Md at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
45. d. at 245. Justice Douglas noted that the record was devoid of evidence "that the
moral and intellectual judgment demanded of the student by the question in this case is
[Vol. 51
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vital third party presence at stake is the idea that the state may limit
parents in their attempts to prevent adolescents from exposure to
values and attitudes inconsistent with their own and allow them to
develop life styles independent of parental aspirations. Freedom to
fashion one's own destiny is essential for adolescents. As Professor
Laurence Tribe has quipped, "after all, they will have ample
opportunity to experience the joys of conformity... after they come
of age.' 6
Tinker v. Des Moines, decided three years previously in 1969,
presents this sentiment but in a slightly different genre.47 In Tinker, a
group of parents organized in protest of the United States policy on
Vietnam and exposed their children to their own viewpoints and
attitudes. The group suggested that the adolescents wear black
armbands to school in "silent protest" against the war in Vietnam.
Learning about the scheduled silent protest, the Des Moines School
Board adopted an edict, forbidding the activity and providing for the
sanction of suspension. Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, struck
down the school board's edict as violative of the guarantees of free
speech and due process. Placing a premium on the nature of the
political expression involved, along with the school district's action
that seemed squarely aimed at the content of the expression, the
Court emphasized the "intercommunication among the students" at
the core of first amendment values and established that only a
substantial and material interference of the school's operation and
curriculum would justify restriction of expression.48 An interesting
point not considered was that the school may have intended to
prevent suppression of ideas by circumscribing exertion of parental
influence over the views of their adolescents, thereby allowing them
to more freely exercise liberty in developing their own ideas,
consistent with the spirit of the first amendment.
That adolescent autonomy, and the ability to develop
autonomous views, are significant to individual development and self-
esteem lurks in decisions following Tinker dealing with school action
to censure library books, student assembly speeches, and class
beyond his capacity" and recognized "substantial agreement among child psychologists
and sociologists that the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that
of the adult." MiL at 245 n.3.
46. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1389.




newspapers. In Board of Education v. Pico,9 Bethel School District v.
Fraser,5 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,51 the Court
preserved parens patriae when school action may shape exposure to
ideas and inculcate values, even manners, and operate in tandem with
parental instillation of values, while reminding us that adolescents do
not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."'52 The Court's analytical
approach circumscribes adolescent discourse and exchange of ideas in
school. As Professor Richard L. Roe explains:
Freedom of speech for children simply has not been accorded the
same weight as it has for adults. The rationale for this disparity is
based on the supposed incompetence of children, arising from their
physical, mental and emotional immaturity.... [that] is thought to
make them more vulnerable to perceived negative influences that
the state as well as parents may want to control through the
curricular authority vested in the state as educator.53
As for educational policy, Professor Roe argues for a
"conceptual-development" model that would view the educational
mission of schools as taking account of student cognitive development
and, thereby, allowing adolescent expression that diverges from the
school's curricular message. ' The spirit of Professor Roe's argument,
coupled with vigilant protection for free expression that evokes
discourse and discussion, is captured, in part, by the Supreme Court
in Epperson v. Arkansas, which invalidated Arkansas' attempt to
stifle the academic presentation of evolution to explain the existence
of humankind.55
Beyond an absence of attention accorded adolescent autonomy
in school speech and the affirmation of the parens patriae interest
furthered by schools, the Court has invoked parens patriae to prohibit
the sale of obscene materials to minors. In Ginsberg v. New York,56
49. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
50. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
51. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
52. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. The Court in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676-77
(1977), upheld a Florida law allowing corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure in
schools when reasonably necessary and not excessive. 1i9
53. Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as Conceptual
Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1271, 1277 (1991).
54. See iL at 1275,1343-44.
55. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
56. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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the Court managed to balance the delicate dichotomy of affirming
that the welfare of youth is within state ambit while safeguarding the
desire of parents to purchase such materials for them. Inevitably, the
Court found no undue invasion on adolescent rights of expression. 7
The Court also relied upon parens patriae to prevent the distribution
of child pornography58 and the dissemination of "smutty" ideas via
radio waves. In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation,'9 upholding the Commission's authority to regulate
George Carlin's satire of "seven filthy words" from free dissemination
over air waves, the Court reaffirmed parens patriae as a vehicle by
which the state may regulate "indecent broadcasting" and support
parents who have the primary responsibility of rearing children by
helping them to prevent hearing vulgar language on the radio.'
Despite White House Conferences in 1930 and 1950 that focused
on a "bill of rights" for children, it was not until the latter half of the
twentieth century-notably the 1960's when "young people [were]
speaking their minds 6 ' and a revolution recognizing rights for
traditionally disenfranchised groups swept the nation-that societal
emphasis was placed on children and adolescents.62 The Children's
Defense Fund was established, federal and state laws regulating child
abuse, neglect, and exploitation were enacted, Commissions on Child
Mental Health and Delinquency were convened, the White House
Conference on Children sponsored a Bill of Rights, echoed in several
state proposals, 6 and the United States Supreme Court announced
that constitutional rights are not for adults alone.'
The "Children's Hour" is how Professor Monrad G. Paulsen
described the Court's initial foray into the rights of children and
adolescents.65 The Court decided Kent v. United Statese and In re
57. Id. at 637, 639.
58. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Court focused on the harm to youth
and the lack of contribution to the marketplace of ideas entailed by child pornography to
justify New York's prohibition of its sale. See id at 756-64.
59. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
60. Id at 749.
61. STEPHEN STILLS, FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH (Cotillion Music, IncJWarner-
Tamerlane Publ'g Corp. 1966).
62. See PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING
IMAGE OF CHILDHOOD 231-37, 250-54 (1992).
63. See id.
64. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
65. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of
Juvenile Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 167.
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Gault67 in 1966 and 1967, respectively, and, as Professor Paulsen
remarked, "lightning struck twice."6' Morris Kent, aged 16 with a
record of violent offenses against persons and property, was accused
of rape and robbery. Without a hearing, written reasons, or responses
to motions filed by counsel, a District of Columbia juvenile court
judge certified Morris for adult criminal trial, despite tenacious efforts
by his attorney to access the records relied upon by the prosecution
and attempts to demonstrate amenability to rehabilitation. Morris
was convicted of robbery and sentenced upwards to ninety years in
prison. Troubled by the terse treatment for transferring an
adolescent to adult criminal court, Justice Fortas, writing for a
majority of the Court, ruled that the Constitution minimally requires
effective representation by counsel which entails the ability to access
prosecutorial evidence, including social records, and that the juvenile
court judge provide a record, explaining the facts and conclusions of
law resulting in certification for criminal trial. Commenting on Kent's
foreshadowing of Gault, Professor Paulsen observed:
Though the Court's opinion in Kent does not actually hurl
constitutional thunderbolts at the nation's juvenile courts and
police practices respecting juveniles, it does raise a warning of
turbulent weather ahead. Mr. Justice Fortas... warned that a
juvenile court judge's exercise of the power parens patriae was
limited by the rule of law: "the admonition to function in a
parental relationship is not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness."6 9
This "procedural arbitrariness" did not escape Justice Fortas' focus
when he wrote the majority opinion for In re Gault the following
year.
Indeed, the Supreme Court delineated juvenile delinquency
proceedings that apply due process standards from the previous
paternalistic system that gave rise to Gault, a system which the Court
maligned as a "kangaroo court."7  Unveiling "essentials of due
process and fair treatment" as the beacon for determining what
constitutional rights attach at delinquency adjudications, the Court
ruled that an adolescent like 15-year-old Gerry Gault, who faced
66. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
67. 387 U.S. at 1.
68. Paulsen, supra note 65, at 184.
69. Id at 183 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 555).
70. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
ADOLESCENT AUTONOMY
detention for six years due to an unsubstantiated allegation that he
made a "lewd telephone call," must be informed of his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination, sixth amendment rights
to counsel and confrontation, and fourteenth amendment right to
notice of the proceeding against him when confronted with a charge
of juvenile delinquency that entails a loss of liberty.71
Regarded as seminal, the import of the Gault decision is
intrinsically fascinating due to the delicate balance of constitutional
rights that attach to juvenile delinquency adjudications and the
preservation of parens patriae:
[I]t is not suggested that juvenile court judges should fail
appropriately to take account, in their demeanor and conduct, of
the emotional and psychological attitude of juveniles with whom
they are confronted. While due process requirements will...
introduce a degree of order and regularity to Juvenile Court
proceedings to determine delinquency, and in contested areas will
introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will
require that the conception of the kindly judge be replaced by its
opposite.'
Specifically, the Court declared that neither "the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone" and that the
premise of fundamental fairness underlying the Due Process Clause
applies equally to adults and adolescents. z Leaving no doubt as to its
first declaration, the Court then carefully confirmed the legal
solicitude toward youth, though a markedly different conception of
the parens patriae permeating a juvenile justice system envisaged by
Julian Mack as "kindly assistance... [and] the friendly interest of the
state." 74
In a series of decisions following Gault that comprise juvenile
justice jurisprudence, the Court employed the "essentials of due
71. lId at 28. The Court explained that
[flailure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in
instances ... of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of
fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the primary
and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits
the powers which the state may exercise.
Id. at 20.
72. l& at 26-27.
73. 1d. at 13.
74. Mack, supra note 23, at 117.
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process and fair treatment" to determine that the evidentiary
standard in juvenile delinquency adjudications is beyond a reasonable
doubt,75 that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial is not essential,76
and that reasonable suspicion is constitutionally appropriate when
school officials initiate and conduct searches of adolescent persons
and property on school grounds.' By establishing due process as the
basis for juvenile rights, the Court reminds us of the law's intrinsic
respect for the dignity of persons, whether children, adolescents, or
adults. Though not explicitly addressed by the Court, implicit in its
rulings affording constitutional rights to adolescents is the corollary
ability to exercise or waive those rights, implying decisional capacity
to do so.
The intervening years since the Court decided Kent and Gault
have resulted in rulings providing a measure of fair process and
procedure to juvenile proceedings infused with parens patriae.
Although no major ruling on adolescent rights was rendered during
the final decade of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court laced a 1999 ruling that a federally funded school district may
be liable in a private damage action under Title IX arising from
student-to-student harassment with parens patriae. In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, a case involving a pattern of
harassment by a fifth grade student towards a classmate, the Supreme
Court described state parens patriae power in public education as
"custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and
control that could not be exercised over free adults."7' Despite a
75. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,359 (1970).
76. See MeKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,545 (1971).
77. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,333 (1984). Attempting to strike a balance
between adolescent privacy rights and the school's interest in securing a safe,
uninterrupted educational environment for the student body, the Court ruled that school
officials may conduct searches of persons and personal effects when there is reasonable
suspicion. See id. at 343-47. While lauding reasonable suspicion as according adequate
protection to student privacy rights and allowing schools the flexibility to maintain order,
one commentator has expressed chagrin at the misapplication the standard invites that is
likely to result in subjecting students "to excessive intrusions on privacy for disregarding
the most trivial school guidelines." Jane M. Lavoie, Note, New Jersey v. T.L.O.:
Misapplication of an Appropriate Standard, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 141, 155-56 (1985).
See also The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 233-43 (1985) (cautioning
courts applying the "relaxed" standard of TLO to ensure that "the exception not
overcome the rule").




vehement dissent authored by Justice Kennedy; who targeted the
Court's nonchalance toward federalism and "any workable definition
of actionable peer harassment,"'7 both majority and dissenting
opinions in Davis are devoid of any attempt to demarcate older
adolescent peer harassment from that of younger children that may
give rise to individual responsibility and accountability rather than
school district liability under federal law. Cases, such as Davis,
illustrate overlooked opportunities by the Court to distinguish older
adolescents from younger children, especially when personal and
decisional actions, including intentional harassment, are involved.
Despite inattention toward adolescent autonomy by American
courts, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which convened on November 20, 1989, called for coherent planning
of policies directly tailored to children and adolescents "rather than
the accumulation of individual measures which affect [them] without
being set in a policy framework."' Heralded as a "landmark in the
history of childhood,"'" the Convention proclaimed the capacity of
adolescents to express views and encouraged respect for those views,
in order to further their full participation in life and to promote
dignified treatment consistent with respect for human rights and
freedoms."' The Convention inspired the Childhood Policies Project
of the Council of Europe, spanning a four year period from 1992
through 1995, and presents a powerful and persuasive force regarding
recognition of adolescent decisional rights. Both France and Great
Britain have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, which has been reinforced through passage of laws in both
countries.' Australia and Canada have also embraced it; yet,
decisional law in those countries has ricocheted in various directions.~'
79. Ia at 677, 684-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
5 (1996).
81. Michael Freeman, Introduction: Children as Persons, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996). For assiduous attention to
the general aims and obligations of the United Nations Convention, see ANDREW
BAINHAM, CHILDREN: THE MODERN LAW 59-66 (2d ed. 1998).
82. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 80, at 12-14, 31-37, 40. See also Roger J.R.
Levesque, The Internationalization of Children's Human Rights: Too Radical for
American Adolescents?, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 237, 243, 293 (1994) (envisioning that the
Convention "could render considerable change," constituting a "formal beginning of what
may be the most important period yet for advancing adolescents' rights").
83. See Freeman, supra note 81, at 93-94. See also BAINHAM, supra note 81, at 66
(emphasizing the enormous "educative and symbolic effect of internationally agreed
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norms against which domestic standards may be measured").
84. The British Parliament, for example, enacted The Children Act, embracing
autonomous decision-making for adolescents. Specifically, the Act accords an "absolute
right... to give informed consent to surgical, medical, psychiatric, and dental treatment"
to adolescents aged 16 and older. Adolescents under 16 possess a qualified right for
decision-making when a physician determines that the adolescent possesses "sufficient
understanding to make an informed decision." See generally Judith Masson, The Children
Act of 1989 and Young People: Dependence and the Rights to Independence, in CHILDREN
AND THE LAW 1-10 (Deborah J. Lockton ed., 1994). Despite parliamentary
pronouncement, the British judiciary, not unlike American courts, persists with a
subjective best interest approach that thwarts the policy embraced by the Act and hinges
on a particular adolescent in particular circumstances with unpredictable ad hoc results.
See J.A. Devereux et al., Can Children Withhold Consent to Treatment?, 306 BRIT. MED. J.
1459, 1460 (1993). Like the United Kingdom, the courts in France are keen to the
kaleidoscopic approach to adolescent autonomy, whereby variegations of decisional ability
are infused with best interests. Particularly, adolescents are thought to possess decisional
privacy, unless juges des enfants determine it is not in their best interests. Although
adolescent autonomous rights are enshrined in legislation passed by the Assemblee
Nationale, France still struggles to strike a stable balance between adolescent autonomy
and protections afforded by French law. Interviews with French Officials at the Ministry
of Justice, in Paris, France (May 1999). See also Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi, The Best
Interests Principle in French Law and Practice, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:
RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 263 (Philip Alston ed., 1994) (retorting
that recourse to "best interests is a convenient pretext for the judge to disregard a legal
rule").
Moreover, Canada has adopted varying approaches to adolescent autonomy, as
evident by the divergent laws among provinces. Consider New Brunswick and British
Columbia, where an adolescent patient is empowered with decisional capacity regarding
health care choices. If that adolescent should be transferred to a medical treatment
facility in Manitoba, she would be deemed decisionally incapable. This confusion
concerning adolescent autonomy has prompted a Canadian commentator to call for
"speedy and coordinated action." Eike-Hener Kluge, Informed Consent by Children:
The New Reality, 152 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1495, 1496-97 (1995). And, Australia,
like the United States, presumes decisional capacity at 18 years, despite ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides that an adolescent
shall "exercise the right to express views freely in all matters affecting him or her."
Douglas Hodgson, The International Legal Recognition and Protection of the Family, 8
AUSTL. J. FAM. L., available in 1994 AJFL LEXIS 22. Although recognizing adolescent
decisional ability and respecting autonomous rights, Australia assesses the exercise of
those rights on situational bases, finessing adolescent best interests. For example,
Australia's policy on sterilization allows judges in Guardianship Tribunals to balance
autonomy with judicial evaluation of needed medical intervention; accordingly,
unpredictable patterns for adolescent rights have emerged. See Kerry Peterson, Private
Decisions and Public Scrutiny: Sterilisation and Minors in Australia, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN LAW AND ETHICS 57-77 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 1996). Despite laudable
reform over the past twenty years, including recognition and ratification of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, international law governing adolescence
lacks clarity and coherence. This suggests that these legal schemes have been "hijacked
by a rhetoric of community and consensual justice that masks the lack of any real change."
See MICHAEL KING & CHRISTINE PIPER, How THE LAW THINKS ABOUT CHILDREN 116
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The view that adolescents should be accorded a level of
decisional autonomy is supported by scientific and developmental
research during the last half of the twentieth century. During the
1950's, Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget published seminal research
explaining that adolescents reach a stage of formal operational
thinking that allows them to reason deductively and think both
abstractly and hypothetically.' Dr. Piaget theorized that a moment
occurs in the course of human development when children discover
that the categories of their reason cannot encompass the facts of their
experience. This moment of recognition results in a shift from a
metaphysical to an empirical truth that charts "the path from
adolescence to the true beginnings of adulthood."" Dr. Piaget's
findings suggest that adolescents who have reached this realization or
formal operational stage possess cognitive abilities equivalent to
those of adults. Although contemporary researchers challenge the
Piagetian model and focus instead on specific task attainment, they
nonetheless underscore its value to understanding cognitive
development!'
(2d ed. 1995). Accord COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 80, at 6 (regarding adolescent
rights as a "slogan in search of a definition").
85. See JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO
ADOLESENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL
STRUCTURES (1958).
86. 1&
87. See, e.g., Gil G. Noam et al., The Interpersonal Self in Life-Span Development
Perspective: Theory, Measurement, and Longitudinal Case Analysis, in LIFE SPAN
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 59-104 (Paul B. Baltes et al. eds., 1990) (heralding the
Piagetian tradition as a valuable contribution to an understanding of the self and
maintaining that functional models that are task-specific and resolve over time are needed
to establish an adequate and encompassing theory of self); ELLIOT JAQUES & KATHRYN
CASON, HUMAN CAPABILITY: A STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL POTENTIAL AND ITS
APPLICATIONS (1994) (discussing the nature of the maturation process beyond
adolescence and into old age, and how this view compares with that of Piaget's and IQ
studies which postulate that capability and intelligence are fully mature by late
adolescence); Gil G. Noam, Beyond Freud and Piaget: Biographical Worlds-
Interpersonal Self, in THE MORAL DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE ONGOING DISCUSSION
BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 360-399 (Thomas E. Wren ed., 1990)
(extending the Piagetian model to developmental patterns throughout a life span); Patricia
H. Miller, Theories of Adolescent Development, in THE ADOLESCENT AS DECISION
MAKER: APPLICATIONS TO DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 13-89 (1989) (emphasizing
Piaget's work within the broader context of twentieth century cognitive theory);
BERTRAM SLAFF, THE HISTORY OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (1981) (tracing the
historical development of the concepts of childhood and adolescence, with special
emphasis on Piaget's developmental psychology of children and adolescents). Accord
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Since the research of Dr. Piaget and his progeny, a compilation
of published studies on adolescent decisional capacity has
accumulated, comprising examinations of adolescent decisional
capacity in various contexts. These studies, some of which directly
confirm Dr. Piaget's findings, suggest that adolescents, aged 14 and
older, possess the cognitive capability to reason, understand,
appreciate, and articulate decisions comparable to young adults.
Perhaps more significantly, there is a paucity of scientific or social
science study that supports the present legal view of adolescent
incapacity." Despite the statistical and scientific evidence, which
merits serious consideration by policy makers, the principle of
decisional incapacity is the raison d' etre for law and the lack of a
coherent legal approach for accommodating adolescent issues. A
backward glance 9 over the twentieth century reveals a promising
legacy for the recognition of adolescent autonomous rights. Realizing
more meaningful exercise of those rights should be a legacy for the
twenty-first century.
H. Adolescence in Contemporary Context
The evolution of the law regarding adolescents has been
challenging at best and tragic at worst. On the challenging front, the
law has delineated specific arenas whereby adolescent decisional
capacity has garnered attention but to an impoverished degree.
Unlike ancient Roman arenas that staged gladiatorial combats from
which emerged a victor, the legal arenas showcasing the issue of
adolescent decisional capacity have yet to see a clear, cohesive
approach emerge victorious. Instead, selective recognition of
adolescent decisional capacity has been linked to the furtherance of
other ends, as when a 14-year-old is tried in criminal court as an adult
because of social desire to hold the adolescent accountable for the
commission of an egregious act. Of course, this has resulted in an
David Elkind, Inhelder and Piaget on Adolescence and Adulthood: A Postmodern
Appraisal, 7 PSYCHOL. Sci. 216 (1996); Kurt W. Fischer & Louise Silvern, Stage and
Individual Differences in Cognitive Development, 36 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGIST 613-48
(1985).
88. See William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development
and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 897 (1989) (noting the absence
of scientific evidence that support "the Court's belief that adolescents are incompetent").
89. A reference to American Pulitzer Prize winning author Edith Wharton's
autobiography, which was published in 1933.
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oversight of the essential element that prompts recognition of rights
for adolescents, which is decisional capability. In other words, the
threshold capacity issue is either overlooked entirely or the pendulum
of incapacity capriciously swings to capacity without examination and
explication.
Especially challenging is the incongruity that reigns supreme on
this legal front, such as when a 14-year-old is tried as an adult in
criminal court, but cannot give consent to basic medical treatment.
Furthermore, under most state emancipation statutes, a 15-year-old
runaway living independently from a parent or guardian may give
effective consent for a medical procedure or be held to a contractual
agreement but an unemancipated 15-year-old, albeit more mature
and responsible in judgment but living at home with a parent, may
not. Of course that same 15-year-old, if a parent herself, could make
the health care decisions on behalf of her infant child, or consent to
her child's adoption. Given the discordant legal approach to
adolescent decisional ability, the law regarding adolescence reads
more like a Greek tragedy with less than heroic results.
A. Family Law Arena
Family law is slowly proving a pivotal venue for recognition of
adolescent autonomy and, consequently, for more meaningful
exercise of legal rights. Indeed, there has been progress among state
court judges and legislatures to allow adolescents to testify as to
preferences in custody disputes. California, Connecticut, and
Pennsylvania are among approximately thirty-four states that
expressly direct family court judges to admit the testimony of
adolescents in custody cases and provide that "if a child is of sufficient
age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as
to custody, the court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes
of the child in making an order granting or modifying custody."'
90. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(a) (West Supp. 2000); See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)-56
(1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303(A)(1) (West 1999). See also ALA. CODE § 30-3-1
(1999); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090 (Lexis L. Publ'g 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.508(9)(a)(5)(a)(V) (West Supp. 2000); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(3) (1993 & Supp.
1999); IOWA CODE § 232.116(2)(b)(2) (1999); K.R.S. § 405-020 (1999); LA. CIV. CODE art.
136(B)(3) (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(i) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025(a)(2) (West 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1)(b) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2)(b) (1988); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(4)(a) (Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(VI)
(1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9
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However, while adolescent preference is explicitly acknowledged as
an important factor for judicial consideration, legislators have
generally determined that it is but one factor to be considered in the
best interest equation.9 Though a single criterion, such preference
may be "the most indispensable."
Most disquieting is that judges consider adolescent preferences
under these legislative directives without any guidance regarding
what constitutes "sufficient age and capacity," what is meant by
"maturity," whether there should be an accompanying capacity
assessment by a mental health professional, what constitutes
"intelligent preference," and precisely how this factor should be
weighted. Even in the few states that stipulate that an adolescent's
expressed preference must not be ignored, such preference is linked
to the judge's subjective evaluation, thereby "yield[ing] to the
paramount consideration of what is best for the child." 93 Other states
require the family court judge to determine whether the child's
preference is "reasonable" and a product of "maturity," but also fail
to provide the judge with any guidance to make these
determinations.' For example, Wyoming emphasizes that an
"unequivocal preference to live with a particular parent is a factor
that, although not conclusive, must be considered." 95 Regrettably,
nothing in the legislative record indicates that law makers have
further reflected on these points, leaving the arduous task of
interpreting and applying the stark statutory language to the courts.
(Michie 1999); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7003 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(i)
(1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(1)(b) (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10
§ 21.1(c) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16(37) (1999);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (Michie
1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(7) (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1999); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. § 665 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(7) (Michie 1999); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-10-2 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113 (Michie 1999).
91. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090 (Lexis L. Publ'g 1999); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.480 (Michie 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 1999).
92. Catherine A. Crosby-Currie, Children's Involvement in Contested Custody Cases:
Practices and Experiences of Legal and Mental Health Professionals, 20 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 289,309 (1996).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 722 (1998).
94. See FLA. STAT. ch. 39.508(9)(a)(5)(a)(V) (1999); MINN. STAT. § 257.025(a)(2)
(1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1515 (Law. Co-op. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106(7)
(1999).
95. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-113 (Michie 1999). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-
9(A)(2)(B) (Michie 1999).
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Judicial record confirms, however, that judges have not clarified
the import and application of these provisions. Instead, trial court
judges have merely tracked legislative language vis-A-vis best interest
elixir which appellate courts have affirmed, without elaboration, on
review. In the Connecticut Superior Court's ruling in Zarate v.
Zarate, the court accepted, without detailed examination, the
attorney's representation that the three minor daughters (aged 17, 14,
and 12) preferred to live with their father and found all three of
sufficient age, capacity, and maturity to make an intelligent
preference.6 The judicial difficulty in "knowing how to weigh and/or
interpret" an adolescent's wishes and determining emotional and
intellectual maturity is documented in empirical research examining
attitudes and practices of judges in the custody litigation process.'
In recent years, however, several courts have substantially
narrowed restrictions on adolescents' parental preference in custody
proceedings. In In re Andersen98, the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed the trial judge's award of custody based upon the testimony
of a 14-year-old boy, who exhibited sound reasons for his
preference.' Specifically, the trial court judge was persuaded by the
young man's desire "to live with his father so he could bond with him
before growing up" and recognized that he "would feel more
comfortable discussing adolescent problems with his father.""'
Similarly, an appellate court in Minnesota accorded serious
consideration to an adolescent's preference, reasoning that the
custodial preference of an adolescent "may be given weight to the
extent that it might bear on the child's emotional well-being when it is
clear to the trial court that it is not the product of manipulation by the
non-custodial parent. 10' Dr. Catherine A. Crosby-Currie
96. Zarate v. Zarate, No. 515117, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1521, at *3 (June 17,
1996).
97. Robert D. Felner et al., Party Status of Children During Marital Dissolution: Child
Preference and Legal Representation in Custody Disputes, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 42,47 (1985).
98. 603 N.E.2d 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
99. ld. at 73.
100. Id.
101. Edsten v. Edsten, 407 N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). Notably, research
examining external influence on adolescent decision-making indicates that adolescents are
no more amenable to peer or parent pressure than young adults. See Donald N. Bersoff &
David J. Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court's Continuing Misuse of Social
Science Research, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 279,292 (1995).
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systematically investigated the practices and experiences of legal and
mental health professionals involved in custody decisions and found
that adolescents "14 and older were reported by all groups as being
likely to be asked" about their wishes, which "were given a great deal
of weight."' '  Empirical examination, coupled with statutes and
judicial decisions, indicate an intent to involve adolescents in the
proceedings that intimately impact their lives, thereby acknowledging
adolescent ability to express reasoned and rational viewpoints.
According to Professor Wallace J. Mlyniec, rejecting an adolescent's
expressed preference constitutes "an assault on personal
autonomy."'03
The scientific and social science literature discussing adolescent
custodial preferences strengthens the important nexus between
empirical research and legal policy making, providing the impetus to
carefully consider and weigh the adolescent's custodial parent
preference. For example, Dr. Ellen Greenberg Garrison clinically
studied 144 adolescents, aged 9 to 14, regarding their perceptions of
custody dilemmas to better understand their reasoning ability. She
reported that adolescents generally possess the capacity for
expressing reasoned and rational viewpoints comparable to young
adults." Particularly, Dr. Garrison found that 14-year-old
adolescents performed as well as 18-years-old adults in response to
hypothetical situations based upon real-life dilemmas.15 She further
found that 9 and 10-year-olds proved to be as competent as the 14
through 18-year-olds according to the reasonableness of preference or
rationality of reasons standard."' Based on these findings, Dr.
Garrison concluded that her data supports the involvement of 9 and
10-year-olds in the custody decision-making process and reinforces a
102. Crosby-Currie, supra note 92, at 305. See also Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children's
Preference in Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 22 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1052 (1988)
(characterizing adolescent preference as "the dominant consideration in resolving disputes
about their custody").
103. Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing A Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873,1905 (1996). Professor Mlyniec further contends that
judges should assume, in the absence of countervailing evidence, that adolescents "above
the age of fourteen-who possess accurate information and are not subject to undue
pressure-have the ability to make decisions as well as adults." Id at 1907.
104. See Ellen Greenberg Garrison, Children's Competence to Participate in Divorce
Custody Decisionmaking, 20 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 78, 84-85 (1991).
105. See id. at 84.
106. See iL
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trend toward granting considerable, if not controlling, weight to the
preference of adolescents, age 14 and older.'°'
These results are consistent with studies conducted by other
researchers who found that judges accord great, if not dispositive,
weight to the custodial preferences of adolescents. Several studies
surveying the views of legal and mental health professionals further
illuminate the decisional ability of adolescents involved in custody
disputes." One study examined the decisions of mental health
professionals, who play a central role in custody cases, finding that the
preference of adolescents is a paramount factor in deciding whether
to recommend either joint or single-parent custody. Related studies
on the perceptions of legal professionals published in the Journal of
Clinical Child Psychology reveal that attorneys and judges were
"nearly equally divided on the issue of the [adolescent's] preference
being among the most important criteria for use in formulating
recommendations for custody,"" a response that corroborates their
uncertainty as to how such preferences should be considered."'
Disturbingly, the researchers found that the wishes of adolescents
have not been a "central concern" to the legal professionals involved
in custody disputes,"' sounding a clarion call for attorney awareness
and attentiveness to ensure that their voices are heard.
This research provides a formidable foundation for both judicial
and legislative consideration that adolescent voices must not only be
heard in custody proceedings but acknowledged and relied upon for
the ultimate determination. The concept that being heard equates
with empowerment has been expressed by the writings of Professor
Katherine Hunt Federle, emphasizing that a major problem in
custody proceedings is a parent's incentive to use a child as a pawn in
the bargaining process."2 She reasons that "it is easier for parents and
their attorneys to ignore the wishes of children when [their] voices are
107. See id, at 85.
108. See, e.g., Felner et al., supra note 97, at 48 (concluding that, in order to promote
"sound custody decisions[,J ... it seems clear that one necessary step is the generation and
effective dissemination of empirical data and effective strategies for addressing these
concerns"). See also Robert D. Felner et al., Child Custody: Practices and Perspectives of
Legal Professionals, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 27 (1985).
109. Felner et al., supra note 97, at 45, 47.
110. See id. at 47.
111. Seeid. at48.
112. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on
the Rights of Children, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1585,1599-1602 (1995).
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not heard and their preferences are not considered.' '13 According to
Professor Federle, providing the adolescent with an opportunity to
participate in the structuring of custody agreements prevents parents
"from using custody as a bargaining tool to obtain financial or other
concessions from one another and may reduce the degree of acrimony
commonly experienced by the parties in a contested custody case. 114
Such acrimony may permeate family court proceedings for
visitation rights, among parents and nonparents. For example, a
Washington statute permitted nonparents to petition the court for
visitation rights "at any time," despite objection from a parent."5 In
Troxel v. Granville, the grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie sought
extensive visitation with their granddaughters after their son
committed suicide. 6 The mother, Tommie Granville, thereafter
married Kelly Wynn, who adopted Isabelle and Natalie. 7 Striking
down the Washington law as an undue incursion on the fundamental
right of parents "to make decisions concerning the care, custody and
control" of their children,18 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality
of the Court, found Washington's lack of "requirement that a court
accord the parent's decision [regarding visitation with a nonparent]
any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever" especially
offensive."9 Yet, the Court did not recognize, even in dicta, the
participation or decisional preferences of an adolescent who has
formed a psychological or emotional attachment with a petitioning
nonparent.12°
Not only is empowerment enormously important for adolescents
caught in custody and visitation disputes, but it is essential for
adolescents captive in a state welfare system.12' In Kingsley v.
113. Id. at 1600.
114. Id. at 1601.
115. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054,2057 (2000).
116. Id. at 2056-59.
117. See id. at 2058.
118. Id. at 2060.
119. Id. at 2061.
120. In dissent, Justice Stevens recognized that minors are "constitutionally protected
actors" whose interests should "be balanced in the equation." Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Although hinting at the concept of autonomous decisional interests, Justice
Stevens neither elaborates nor elucidates the nature of these interests. Id.
121. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RaV. 199 (1988).
Professor Michael B. Mushlin provides an in-depth and didactic discussion of the
disempowerment and the lack of adequate protections for children under laws governing
1292 [Vol. 51
Kingsley, the Florida Court of Appeals recognized Gregory Kingsley,
who was 11-years-old, by allowing him to initiate proceedings in his
own right to terminate his biological mother's claim to him."
Recapitulating presumptive incapacity of minors for decision-making,
the court nevertheless found harmless error by the trial court judge
who recognized Gregory's petition for termination of parental rights
and respected Gregory's compelling testimony."z This precedent,
though limited, is vital to the recognition of adolescent autonomy in
the family law arena, where adolescents are not likely to be
represented by independent legal counsel and consequently not likely
to be heard or regarded seriously." In Kingsley, however, the Florida
Appellate Court could have directly recognized Gregory's capability
for deciding severance of ties with his biological mother. That
approach would have been preferable to the harmless error analysis
because it would have signified a legal venue for adolescent
viewpoint.
B. Juvenile Delinquency Arena
The centrifugal force of the juvenile justice system has been the
fundamental fairness concept underlying due process. In each of the
juvenile rights progeny decided by the United States Supreme Court
from Kent v. United States"z and In re Gault2 to In re Winship'21 and
foster care. In so doing, he assesses constitutional rights of foster children to protection,
advocates for federal judicial protection from harm, and proposes precise guidelines that
would "maximize the potential effectiveness of district courts in making foster care safe."
Id. at 203.
122. 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
123. See id. at 786-90. For interesting insight about this case, see George R. Russ,
Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K.": A Child's Right to be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q.
365, 369 (1993). See also Jay C. Laubscher, Note, A Minor of 'Sufficient Age and
Understanding' Should Have the Right to Petition for the Termination of the Parental
Relationship, 40 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 565 (1996).
124. To ensure adequate legal representation and a right to be heard, one commentator
asserts that "all foster children should be given the opportunity to initiate parental rights
termination," reasoning that, "[i]f given a voice that is guaranteed to be heard by those
responsible for making the decisions that so dramatically affect their lives, foster children
will finally have the opportunity to obtain permanent and healthy homes." Christina
Dugger Sommer, Note, Empowering Children: Granting Foster Children the Right to
Initiate Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1200,1262 (1994).
125. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
126. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
127. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (ruling that evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt is an essential of due process and fair treatment in juvenile delinquency
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McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'8 the overriding question has been
whether a particular constitutional right, such as the privilege against
self-incrimination or the fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, is an essential element of due
process to be accorded juveniles faced with delinquency proceedings
that may result in a loss of liberty. An essential element of due
process is the capacity of an individual to stand trial. The Supreme
Court underscored this principle in Medina v. California, wherein it
characterized the concept that an incompetent criminal defendant
should not be required to stand trial as "fundamental in our common-
law heritage." Consequently, the criminal prosecution of a defendant
lacking the capacity to stand trial offends a "principle of justice...
rooted in the traditions and conscience" of the United States.
129
Capacity to stand trial is integral to juvenile and criminal justice
proceedings and is a threshold requirement at various stages from
waiver of rights during pretrial stages to post-trial sentencing.
Paradoxically, in this arena, the presumption of incapacity has been
reversed, even with regard to whether an adolescent should be
sentenced to the most irreversible sanction in law-capital
punishment.' Presuming decisional competency for an adolescent
capital defendant seems counterintuitive and unconscionable for a
rehabilitative juvenile justice system, exasperating problems of
disproportionality, error, and inadequate procedural safeguards
plaguing the death penalty generally 3' and, particularly, the legal
adjudications).
128. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (determining that sixth amendment right to a jury in a
juvenile delinquency adjudication is not essential to due process or fundamental fairness).
For a thoughtful discussion of the implications of McKeiver, see The Supreme Court-1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 113 (1971).
129. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,458-59 (1992).
130. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (ruling that adolescents aged 16
and 17 at the time they committed a capital crime may face the death penalty under the
United States Constitution). See also Catherine A. Crosby et al., The Juvenile Death
Penalty and the Eighth Amendment: An Empirical Investigation of Societal Consensus and
Proportionality, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 245, 258 (1995) (studying the perceptions via
questionnaire of 179 former jurors and finding support for the "legally contrived bright
line" whereby a 16-year-old offender may be executed constitutionally).
131. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, at 5 (June 12, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with Columbia University
School of Law) (reporting that "an astonishing 2% (247 out of 301) of capital judgments
were reversed or were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or no sentence
at all. In the latter regard, 7% (22/301) of the reversals for serious error resulted in a
determination on retrial that the defendant was not guilty of the capital offense").
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treatment of juvenile offenders. There are now over 65 death row
inmates in the United States, who were juvenile offenders.'32
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Stanford v. Kentucky
declared that a jury sentencing to death a juvenile offender who
committed homicide at the age of 16 does not "offend evolving
standards of decency of a civilized society,""' the trend of trying
young offenders as adults presages revisitation of the issue of whether
a 15-year-old may be subjected to the most severe sanction."
Capacity is the precursor to culpability and a delicate dichotomy
of accountability and rehabilitation pervade the present juvenile
justice system. Because rehabilitation remains a viable objective
underlying the system, capacity assessments may serve the dual
purpose of providing therapeutic treatment, as well as assuring that
the juvenile defendant is competent to stand trial consistent with
"deeply rooted notions of justice" under federal and state
constitutions. Richard Barnum and Thomas Grisso emphasize this
integral link between accountability and capacity, providing valuable
insight into the problem of juvenile capacity to stand criminal trial
from "a therapeutic perspective [that] directs us to examine how the
law works either to support or to subvert efforts at providing mental
health care, and the effects of participation in the legal process upon
the defendant or patient who experiences the process."" 5 Reasoning
that "[a]n offender is more likely to have a positive response to
treatment when he or she is able to take responsibility for the
behavior that the treatment aims to change,""6 they strengthen the
significance of addressing the juvenile's capacity to stand trial "in a
substantive way" because "challenging questions arise as to what
capacities in a youth are relevant to [the issue of competence for
132. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNIsHMENT 1999 (2000). See also David Cole, Why Do We Lock Up So Many Citizens,
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 17, 2000 (citing to statistical indices revealing that the United States
has "killed 13 juvenile offenders in the past decade, and another 70 juvenile offenders are
on death row").
133. 492 U.S. at 378-80.
134. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821-38 (1988) (deciding that the
application of Oklahoma's death penalty statute to a homicide defendant who was 15-
years-old at the time of the crime offends the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (using
the standard of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958))).
135. Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court in




trial], in what ways they differ from analogous capacities in adults and
how they should be addressed and measured in clinical evaluation." '137
According to these authors, "[i]f a mental disability prevents the
offender from appreciating what was alleged to have occurred or
from taking a reasonable role in establishing the facts of the matter, it
is difficult to expect the offender to become an ally in treatment.""x
The import of these points resonate with nascent federal and
state legislative enactments that expand the number of adolescent
offenders initially under criminal, rather than juvenile, court
jurisdiction. Historically, the only offense that effectively stripped
away juvenile court jurisdiction was homicide. Pennsylvania's
transfer amendments, enacted in 1996, are exemplary. Beyond the
exclusion of murder, Pennsylvania law also excludes from juvenile
court a minor who was 14 years of age at the time of the offense and
used a deadly weapon or a minor 15 years of age with a previous
adjudication of a felony, who is charged with any one of nine
engrafted violent crimes, including aggravated assault, rape, or
robbery.9 As with a charge of homicide, these amendments place the
burden by a preponderance of evidence on the adolescent to convince
the trial judge that he is amenable to the treatment, supervision, or
rehabilitation of the juvenile court, a burden seldom satisfied in this
context.' 4
137. Id. at 342.
138. Id. at 336.
139. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6355 (e), (g) (West 1999). Involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse, robbery of motor vehicle, aggravated indecent assault, kidnapping, and
voluntary manslaughter comprise the host of offenses engrafted to exclude adolescents
from juvenile court jurisdiction, as well as evidence of an attempt, conspiracy or
solicitation to commit any of these crimes. Id. at (g)(1), (2). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 8-341(E) (1999) (providing criminal court jurisdiction for a juvenile at 15 years of age, if
charged with a felony offense and if he has a previous adjudication); ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/18-2 (West 1999) (permitting criminal court jurisdiction for a 15-year-old charged with
armed robbery, regardless of whether a weapon was displayed during commission of the
crime); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 § 61 (Lw. Co-op. 1999) (excluding adolescents between
the ages of 14 and 17 from juvenile court jurisdiction, if the adolescent was previously
committed to the Department of Youth Services and charged with crime that would be
punishable by imprisonment if the adolescent were an adult or if charged with an offense
involving infliction or threat of serious bodily harm); MD CODE ANN. CrS., & JUD. PROC.
§ 3-804(E)(1)(1999) (mandating criminal court jurisdiction for a juvenile who is 14 years of
age and charged with attempted murder). Accord 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994) (mandating
adult criminal prosecution for delineated violent felonies and serious narcotic offenses).
140. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355 (g) (West 2000). These amendments
survived constitutional scrutiny in Commonwealth v. Cotto, 708 A.2d 806, 813-14 (Pa.
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Passage of these amendments has been a visceral response to the
gravity and frequency of juvenile crime against persons and
property. '  However, the amendments entirely overlook the core
issue of capacity for adult criminal trial with concomitant sanctions. '42
This oversight is exemplified in the highly publicized murder
prosecutions of 11-year-old Nathaniel Abraham in Michigan and 12-
year-old Lionel Tate in Florida under the aegis of 'get tough on
juvenile crime' laws. In other words, states like Michigan, Florida,
and Pennsylvania presume adolescent decisional incapacity, except in
certain classes of crime. Most, if not all, of these 'get tough' statutes
include conspiracy for the enumerated categorical crimes, inferring
that the adolescent possessed the knowing intent to agree and
facilitate the commission of a crime. The element of conspiracy alone
contradicts the governing legal presumption of decisional incapacity
for adolescence, offending both justice and fundamental fairness
underlying constitutional due process. Hence, it is incumbent upon
attorneys representing juveniles to raise the issue of competency for
trial due to the crucial gap left by legislators and unlikely to be
addressed by judges sua sponte.'43 Not only would juvenile defense
Super. Ct. 1998).
141. National response to societal and political appeals has been interconnected with
international treatment of youth violence. See MICHAEL KING & CHRISTINE PIPER, How
THE LAW THINKS ABOUT CHILDREN 35 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that the juvenile justice
system in the United Kingdom throughout the 1980s and 1990s "was constantly being
changed to meet political demands"). For erudite treatment of reform proposals for
transfer to criminal court that seek to diminish arbitrariness in judicial decision-making
while enhancing community protection, see Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to
Criminal Court: Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 709.
142. See Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A
Developmental Perspective, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 238 (1996) (reaffirming the need
to reassess the law's present approach that mandates "transfer and the harshly punitive
consequences of criminal court convictions based on the nature of adolescents' offenses").
See also Anthony J. Petrosino, How Can We Respond Effectively to Juvenile Crime?, 105
PEDIATRICS 635, 636 (2000) (criticizing "policy by murder," whereby a "flurry of laws
[are] enacted in response to horrific incidents" and calling for more careful policy
analysis).
143. There are, however, reasons to justify a lesser threshold of competency for
adolescents facing juvenile, as opposed to criminal, court adjudication, including "less
severe penalties and shorter confinement" and the "educational and clinical interventions
as part of their rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system." Thomas Grisso, The
Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3,26 (1997).
Dr. Grisso also provides suggestions for counsel raising the issue of an adolescent's
capacity for trial. See id. at 22-23. Notably, further empirical research addressing
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counsel be ineffective for not presenting the issue but rules of
professional responsibility would seem to imbue an ethical duty to do
so. For example, the rule of professional conduct mandating
competent representation inherently requires that defense counsel
understand and zealously present evidence related to competency for
trial, including criteria that should be employed for determining
whether an adolescent is competent to be tried as an adult.1"
Thorough preparation for presenting the issue entails mental health
evaluation of the adolescent, along with an expert who can testify to
scientific data that may inform the court about this pivotal issue.
Vigilant preparation is required when an adolescent tried in criminal
court may be sentenced to death. Ethical responsibilities include
communication with the adolescent so she may fully participate in her
defense.145 Professional standards also suggest that a prosecutor
should not seek to obtain, especially from an unrepresented
adolescent, a waiver of constitutional rights. '
Equally troubling has been the treatment given by trial judges to
the issue of waiver. Typically, judges accept a juvenile's waiver of
momentous constitutional rights as fait accompli, particularly where
the juvenile will face adult sanctions, and both trial and appellate
court cases are legion in upholding the waiver with limited exception
and little elaboration, if any. Precisely because a tour de force in
criminal conviction is confession, the process of extracting confessions
should inspire confidence and fundamental fairness, rather than
visages of untrustworthy evidence that necessitate, as Professor Welsh
White persuasively argues, heightened constitutional safeguards."
The case of Shuntae Ingram is instructive. Shuntae was 12-years-old
when he was charged with felony murder and uttered an inculpatory
statement to the police. Unimpeded by the fact that Shuntae was 12,
impaired by mental disability, and afflicted with Attention Deficit
adolescent capacity in this context is desirable to increase understanding and provide
strategies for this issue.
144. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1, Rule 1.1 cmt.,
reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMONS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS (1999).
145. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14, Rule 1.14 cmt.,
reprinted in REGULATIONS OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS, supra note 144.
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC Rule 3.8, Rule 3.8 cmt.,
reprinted in, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS, supra note 144.
147. See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997).
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Hyperactivity Disorder, the Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's admission of the confession. Without analysis, the court
de-emphasized the factual circumstances and denounced that youth
alone could "prevent a voluntary confession or a knowing waiver of
constitutional rights."' "
Minor suspects who are taken into custody, like their adult
counterparts, are subjected to interrogation for the purpose of
obtaining incriminating evidence to be used against them at the
adjudicatory proceeding. The Supreme Court's ruling in Dickerson v.
United States, 149 reaffirmed both the substance and spirit of Miranda,
but did not delineate any additional guidelines for police practices
toward either adult or adolescent suspects. Although several states
provide the adolescent with access to a trusted adult for consultation
before and during interrogation," ° the Supreme Court has also ruled
that the federal Constitutional guarantee of counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination will be invoked per se only with the
adolescent's express request for an attorney.15' Paradoxically, despite
the legal presumption that adolescents lack decisional capacity due to
their minor status, judges nonetheless typically accept a minor's
waiver of rights without more than the routine totality of the
circumstances approach afforded an adult's waiver of rights; of
course, adults are presumed by law to possess decisional capacity.
This disturbing tendency did not escape the scathing bite of Judge
McKay, dissenting from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
148. Ingram v. State, 918 S.W.2d 724,728 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). See also In the Interest
of Jennifer A.J., No. 94-2735, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1024, at *12 (Ct. App. August 24,
1995) (finding knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights by 15-year-old
Jennifer AJ., who was charged with attempted first degree murder).
149. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
150. See, e.g., Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Colo. 1999); Commonwealth
v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797, 800 (Pa. 1977).
151. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). By insisting that adolescents invoke
the scripted language of counsel or attorney, the reasoning and result of Fare narrows the
import of Miranda, whose primary concern was the unequal, inherently coercive
environment of custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Moreover, it would seem that any adolescent requesting a probation officer, parent or
adult friend is conveying the message that he would prefer speaking with someone he
trusts and with whom he wishes to consult. Therefore, an adolescent's request to speak
with someone other than police officers should be tantamount to a per se invocation of
fifth and sixth amendment rights, consistent with the tenets of Miranda and Dickerson
and the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile justice system. For another perspective on Fare
v. Michael C., see Thomas Grisso, Juvenile's Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. RaV. 1134, 1135-1143 (1980).
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affirmance of a juvenile waiver of constitutional rights, who searingly
reflected that "[t]he Anglo-American legal system has long
recognized the reduced capacity of minors to make reasonable
decisions on their own behalf, yet upholds a minor's ability to make
an informed judgment regarding waiver of important fifth
amendment rights." 2 As Dr. Thomas Grisso details, many minor
suspects whose waiver of rights have resulted in delinquent
adjudications and convictions have neither fully understood the
logistics nor the import of the very rights they were purportedly
surrendering. Consequently, the waiver of such rights seems illusory
and fundamentally unfair.
Considering the issue of juvenile waiver in painstaking detail
through empirical analysis, Dr. Grisso's work is informative. His
groundbreaking research published in 1980 examined the
psychological capacities of minors to relinquish Miranda rights
knowingly and voluntarily. Dr. Grisso studied the minor suspects'
ability to understand the words and phrases employed by the
ubiquitous warning and whether the minor suspect possessed the
cognitive developmental capacity to perceive the function and
significance of the rights conveyed by the warning. 3 Dr. Grisso
discovered that: (1) minors younger than 15 years manifested
significantly poorer comprehension than adults of comparable
intelligence; and (2) adolescents 15 years and above understood their
constitutional rights, along with the consequent waiver of those rights,
in a manner comparable to adults." These findings underscore, in
significant part, both predecessor and successor studies indicating that
adolescents are more competent decision makers than the law has
presumed.
Decisional capacity for adolescents who are 15 and older should
be carefully considered in this context. A chief consideration should
include acknowledgement of adolescent decisional ability, which
would not careen the rehabilitative course of the juvenile justice
system;155 rather, it would comport with social norms embraced by this
152. United States v. Palmer, 604 F.2d 64,68 (10th Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting).
153. See Grisso, supra note 151, at 1143.
154. See id. at 1157.
155. See also Matter of W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1265-67 (D.C. 1990) (determining that
the application of Dusky v. United States competency for trial standard to juvenile
delinquency adjudications neither deviates from rehabilitative goals nor constitutes
fundamental unfairness under the Due Process Clause).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [V/ol. 51
ADOLESCENT AUTONOMY
area of the law, along with trends in other legal arenas, such as family
law and tort, that accord recognition to adolescent decisional ability.
Forthright recognition of decisional capability, coupled with attention
to constitutional safeguards and effective legal representation for
adolescent defendants, would enhance fairness and uniformity, yet
provide defense counsel the opportunity to proffer mitigating
evidence, such as diminished capacity, when appropriate.5 6
Consequently, a decisional autonomy approach toward adolescents
accused of criminal offenses would increase fact finding accuracy and
fair treatment calibrated by essentials of due process, especially in a
climate where adolescents are increasingly charged with crimes and
confronted with criminal sanctions.
C. Contract and Tort Law Arena
A quintessential query to a contracts class by a law professor may
be as follows: Suppose that a 35-year-old strikes an agreement with a
17-year-old regarding the sale of the elder's red corvette, and in good
faith delivers to the younger man the automobile under the terms of
the agreement, which stipulates that a payment of $5,000.00
constitutes the bargained-for-exchange. Despite requests and
demands, no payment is forthcoming. What result? The classic
response is that the 17-year-old would prevail, because an adolescent
may disaffirm a contract based on minority status, alone. Moreover,
upon reaching 18 years, he may either disaffirm or ratify the contract,
although the preferred and prevailing approach is to disallow
disaffirmance where the adult contracting party relied on the
agreement to her detriment.'7 Adolescents, however, are legally
responsible for the reasonable value of necessaries furnished to
them.15 Apparently, adolescents may not bargain away the power of
156. Cf. Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to
Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48
EMORY L.J. 65, 105 (1999) (surmising that "support for adolescent autonomy in a wide
range of non-criminal justice contexts clashes with a commitment to a more paternalistic,
rehabilitative approach to juvenile crime as compared with adult crime").
157. See JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 23, at 40 (3d ed. 1990).
158. See Carmen Rivera v. Reading Hous. Auth., 819 F. Supp. 1323, 1331, 1335 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (relying on Pennsylvania law for the axiomatic proposition that minors may
enter into enforceable contracts for "necessaries" and upholding against constitutional
challenge the housing authority's requirement that minor applicants for public housing
provide a judicial decree of emancipation). The "necessaries" exception to the
disaffirmance rule is unsettling and unpredictable because of the difficulty in precisely
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disaffirmance, because the quid pro quo surrender is, itself, subject to
disaffirmance.
The rule of disaffirmance or "infancy doctrine" dates back
centuries."' Comparing adolescents "to those persons laboring under
mental incapacity," the Ohio Supreme Court in 1896 invoked the
disaffirmance rule to further the "elementary principle that
contracting minds must meet and agree upon terms and
consideration."' Not even an "overwhelming influence on modem
contract law" like the Uniform Commercial Code has displaced the
disaffirmance rule, which is entrenched in American law.'61
The power of disaffirmance constitutes both a sword and shield,
as it may be used either defensively or offensively, as the case of
Monahan v. Friederick1 2 illustrates. Brian Monahan agreed to
purchase a used car owned by Don Friederick and executed a
contract for sale.'o Under the sale agreement, legal consideration
amounted to $1,795, which Brian paid." Brian used the auto for
transportation to and from work and for recreation, until it entailed
mechanical problems.165 Brian then sought to disaffirm the contract,
return the car, and recover the purchase price, which was refused by
the defendant.'6 Invoking the disaffirmance rule, the Wisconsin
Appellate Court ruled that Brian was entitled to the return of the
purchase price, $1,795.167
The rule of disaffirmance may also be characterized as a double-
edged sword. The purported empowerment based solely on minority
defining "necessaries." See Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the "Infancy
Law Doctrine": From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHiO N. U. L. REV. 481, 488-90
(1994) (discussing the necessaries doctrine and highlighting the difficulty courts experience
when applying it).
159. See Robert E. Edge, Voidability of Minors Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a
Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205,219 (1967). See also Sanger v. Hibbard, 104 F. 455,
456 (8th Cir. 1900); Wells v. Seixas, 24 F. 82,83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); Taylor v. Beck, 24 Va.
(3 Rand.) 316 (1825); Vogelsgang v. Null, 3 S.W. 451,452 (Tex. 1887).
160. Hosler v. Beard, 43 N.E. 1040,1042 (Ohio 1896).
161. MURRAY, supra note 157, at v. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305 (1999);
DiMatteo, supra note 158, at 522 (disparaging the disaffirmance rule as "in complete
discord with purposes of UCC that are to simplify, clarify and modernize law").
162. No. 89-1725-Fr, 1990 Wisc. App. LEXIS 230, at *1 (Ct. App. Mar. 8,1990).
163. See id. at * 1, 3.
164. See id.
165. See id. at * 3.
166. See id.
167. See id. at *5.
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status is, in effect, quite disempowering by presuming that adolescents
must be protected against improvident judgments and impaired
decisional ability that negates responsibility and accountability. The
rule is also rather arbitrary and unjust because it requires a
contracting party who bargains in good faith to shoulder the risk of
disaffirmance, despite the possibility that the contracting adolescent
may be more mature or have business acumen that may equal, or
even exceed, that of adults.'a Moreover, the rule may actually invite
contrived overreaching or fraud by an adolescent.' 6
Urging dismantlement of the disaffirmance rule is Professor
Larry A. DiMatteo, who seeks to have it declared "civiliter
mortuus" 70 and replaced with a "factors" test, whereby the issue of
whether a particular adolescent possessed decisional capacity to
contract would be determined on a case-to-case basis.' According to
Professor DiMatteo, adolescents should be estopped from invoking
the rule due to their sophisticated and increased purchasing power,
which essentially disserves both the purpose of the rule and the
reasonable care that comprise the "'new spirit' of contract."'"
While I agree with Professor DiMatteo that conclusive incapacity
belies the reality of adolescent capability and market savvy, I am
concerned that the proposed factors approach will result in
inveterate, situational-subjectiveness, and will likely adduce the
instability and unpredictability in contract law that causes Professor
DiMatteo to recoil' 3 The proposal is also shy of an evidentiary
standard and allocation of proof. Specifically, the proposal fails to
explain how each of the "factors" should be identified, proved, and
weighted. Conclusive incapacity should not occupy a place in
168. The import of this point is illustrated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
investigation of 16-year-old Jonathan Lebed, who pocketed nearly a million dollars in
profit from an alleged scheme to dupe adult investors vis-d-vis the Internet, in violation of
federal securities laws. See 60 Minutes: Wallstreet Wizard (CBS television broadcast, Oct.
22,2000); Business Briefing, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 6,2000, at C-2.
169. See Robert E. Richardson, Children and the Recorded-Message Industry: The Need
for a New Doctrine, 72 VA. L. REv. 1325, 1334 (1986) (characterizing the infancy doctrine
as "an anachronism in an economy where young people play an important part. The idea
that the business world should categorically exclude all persons under the age of eighteen
is simply unacceptable in a modem society").
170. Civiliter mortuus is defined as "dead in the view of the law." BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990).
171. DiMatteo, supra note 158, at 484,524.
172. kIL at 517-18, 525.
173. See iL at 521-22.
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contract law, as Professor DiMatteo correctly suggests,1 74 but
adolescents should be presumed bound by their promise, unless the
adolescent successfully proves by preponderance of the evidence,
coercion, misrepresentation, fraud, or one of the other staple contract
defenses that may include evidence of diminished capacity
substantially impairing understanding of the nature and purpose of
the agreement. A clear, straightforward rule recognizing adolescent
decisional ability to contract would be commensurate with the
diligence, efficiency, and economic hallmarks of contract law and,
perhaps more potently, cultivate its mainstream moral component-
that promises ought to be kept.'" Promotion of this moral component
shapes a sense of responsibility and accountability of the emerging
adult within the adolescent, whose temptation to renege unjustly on a
promise may be quelled.
Contract law interrelates and intersects with tort law, as when
one initiates a lawsuit alleging both contract and tort theories of
recovery or when a contract action has tortious overtones. Unlike the
fixation on adolescent decisional incapacity pervading the law of
contracts, tort law deems adolescents decisionally capable to sue and
holds adolescents liable under theories of negligence and intentional
tort. 6 Paradoxically, the adolescent who may disaffirm a contract
may nonetheless be held liable for the tortious interference of it, as
well as the torts of misrepresentation or fraud." One notable
difference between suing an adolescent, as opposed to an adult, for
intentional tort is a sliding scale standard of care. Rather than the
objective reasonable person standard, adolescents are sometimes held
to a variable subjective standard, one that adjusts to the adolescent's
experience, maturity, and understanding of the consequences of her
actions. 8 In stark contrast to the disaffirmance rule of contract law,
174. See id. at 518.
175. See MURRAY, supra note 157, at 1.
176. Dissenting from the majority opinion in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), which permitted a private damages action under Title IX
arising from student-to-student sexual harassment, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, reaffirmed that primary and secondary
school students "have recourse against [an] offending student (or his parents) under state
tort law." Id. at 684. See also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
177. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1071-72 (5th ed. 1984).
178. See Berman by Berman v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 545,550 (Pa. Super.
1983) (reasoning that, although an objective standard is applied when judging the
negligence or contributory negligence of a minor, a subjective standard is appropriate for a
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there is no automatic age barrier to adolescent liability in tort law,
which emphasizes the deterrence of anti-social proclivity and
compensation for injured persons. That minority is not a defense
against adolescent liability for damages is axiomatic in tort law.7'
For well over a century, adolescents have also been held legally
responsible for contributory or comparative negligence. For example,
the Georgia Supreme Court in 1883 reversed a verdict in favor of
Jefferson Brinson on the basis of contributory negligence.'
Jefferson, who was 15-years-old, brought suit against Central
Railroad, for injuries and ultimate amputation of his leg when a plank
extending from a rail car injured him as he was walking to school."'
The Georgia high court in Central Railroad v. Brinson held Jefferson
responsible for his own care and negligence and found that a person
"who is neither a lunatic, idiot nor insane and who has arrived at 14
years of age" should be held responsible in cases of tort.'"
Unlike the antiquated age demarcation of contract law, which
assumes decisional inability for all minors under eighteen years of
age, tort law has consistently recognized adolescent decisional
capability for engaging in particular activities and accountability when
those activities result in injury to another. Adolescents are likewise
deemed decisionally capable to initiate and maintain legal action
against an adult tortfeasor. In the rare instances where adolescents
have been restricted from maintaining a tort action, the courts'
reasons have little to do with decisional capacity. Rather, the courts'
reasons are based on the social policy of encouraging family harmony
and discouraging collusion and depletion of family resources, such as
when an adolescent seeks to hold a parent responsible for injuries
resulting from the adult's negligence."
minor who has allegedly assumed the risk of incurring injury).
179. See Redd v. Bohannon, 166 So. 2d 362, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1964). See also
American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (Kan. 1968) (finding minor
tortfeasors answerable for damages caused by negligence to the same extent as adults);
Queens Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 132 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1965) (stating that minors who
are 7 years of age or older are liable for intentional torts as well as for ordinary
negligence). Accord United States Fidelity & Guar. v. Ekleberry, No. L-76-116, 1976
Ohio App. LEXIS 7033, at *1 (Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1976).
180. See Central R.R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207 (1883).
181. See iL at 213-14.
182. IL at 209. See also Schneider v. City of Seattle, 600 P.2d 666, 671 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979) (holding minor responsible for contributory negligence).
183. See Frey v. Blanket Corp., 582 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 1998) (deciding that
concerns for family harmony and depletion of family resources constitute a bar, unless the
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D. Health Care Arena
Health care decision-making deeply affects each one of us, at
various stages and in various ways. The governing legal consensus is
two-fold: first, adults have a legal right to be fully informed about the
benefits, risks, and options of medical treatment and to provide
consent for their own care, competently and voluntarily; second,
competent adults have the corollary right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment.' From Quinlan to Cruzan-and the numerous
state court decisions in between 1'-judges and legislatures zealously
guard these rights under the rubric of individual autonomy or, as the
Supreme Court observed, more appropriately analyzed as a vital
liberty concept'86
Adolescents also possess these rights in theory but the legal
presumption of decisional incapacity impairs the exercise of these
rights in practice. Anyone under 18 must obtain the consent of a
parent or legal guardian for medical treatment or surgical procedures
because, whether seven or seventeen, they are presumed incapable of
making the decision. According to Professor Laurence Tribe, the
legal presumption of adolescent incapacity "cuts both ways": "a rule
has emerged that a minor too young to consent to a particular form of
treatment is also too young to refuse such treatment when a parent
adolescent adduces evidence that the adult actions were wanton, willful or "brutal, cruel,
or inhuman treatment [was] inflicted" (quoting Pullen v. Novak, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (Neb.
1959))). See also Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 512 A.2d 130, 134-36 (Conn. 1986) (allowing 15-
year-old adolescent to proceed against father for injuries sustained on father's work site).
But see Sixkiller v. Summers, 680 P.2d 360, 361 (Okla. 1984) (upholding parental immunity
from suit where father furnished son with bow and arrow and son suffered injury);
Hoffmeyer v. Hoffmeyer, 869 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Tex. App. 1984) (restricting tort action
against parents for unintentional errors or ordinary negligence committed during the
discharge of parental duties and responsibilities); Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d
1014, 1019 (Ohio 1982) (declining to recognize the ability of an adolescent to recover in
tort for personal injuries from mother's negligence in operating an automobile). Several
other courts have rejected an adolescent's claim for loss of society and companionship
from a parent due to another's negligence. See, e.g., Norwest v. Presbyterian
Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318,326-33 (Or. 1982).
184. See Pearce, supra note 2, at 713 (observing that "the right to give consent is
worthless if it is not accompanied by the right to refuse consent"); Devereux et al., supra
note 84, at 1460 (opining that the right to consent obviates the right to refuse it because
"[o]therwise the right to consent would seem to be no more than the right to agree with
the medical practitioner").
185. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1989 & Supp. 1999) for a thorough survey
of state court decisions addressing issues pertaining to end-of-life decision-making.
186. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279 n.7 (1990).
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insists upon the minor's receiving it."' 8' Moreover, when a parent or
legal guardian consents to treatment for an adolescent patient,
despite the adolescent's capability, it is akin to surrogate decision-
making for adults, whereby another, usually a family member,
consents to treatment. A critical difference is that the standard for
surrogate decision-making is substituted judgment, i.e., how the
patient would decide if he or she could communicate. Yet, with
adolescent patients, parents or guardians decide treatment based on
best interests when the patient herself may be fully capable of
directing her own care.
Certainly, the emergence of adolescent patient decision-making
implicates issues of autonomy, personhood, and dignity in a
fundamental way. The doctrine of informed consent, embracing
distinct concepts of personal respect and dignity, would seem
especially viable for adolescents by enabling them to actively
participate and be decisionally accountable. Therapeutically,
recognition of an adolescent patient's decisional capability "often
leads to better patient care and outcome."1 g Although the American
Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics encourages
pediatricians to obtain the informed consent of adolescent patients,
the Committee's ethical recommendations, approved by the Council
on Child and Adolescent Health, are circumscribed by current law
and public policy that generally requires parental permission except
in exceptional circumstances."l This ethical quandary is proving
187. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 199 (1990). This
rule is particularly troublesome in the area of abortion, as will be discussed infra notes
338-340 and accompanying text.
188. Nancy M. P. King & Alan W. Cross, Children as Decision Makers: Guidelines for
Pediatricians, 115 J. PEDIATRICS 10, 11 (1989); Garry S. Sigman & Carolyn O'Connor,
Exploration for Physicians of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 119 J. PEDIATRICS 520, 525
(1991). Bioethicist and author Dan W. Brock views adolescent involvement in health care
decision-making in a similar vein. He defines a principal focus of well-being as "fostering
those abilities and opportunities so that as adults they will be able to choose, revise over
time, and pursue their own particular plans of life, or aims and values." According to Dr.
Brock, it "promotes their well-being by increasing their level of compliance in cooperating
with and carrying through the treatment." Dan W. Brock, Children's Competence for
Health Care Decisionmaking, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL
ISSUES 181, 193 (Loretta M. Kopelman & John C. Moskop eds., 1989).
189. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent,
Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314-17 (1995). The
idea that physicians who care for adolescent patients should proceed cautiously is not
exclusive to the United States. See Devereux et al., supra note 84, at 1461.
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especially frustrating among physicians who perceive adolescents as
possessing decisional ability." For example, the chairperson of the
Ethics Committee for a large Pittsburgh health care system described
his tireless attempts to revise the health system's policy to recognize
adolescent decisional capability and to permit adolescent medical
decision-making, only to be "stonewalled" by legal counsel.
As the following sections discuss, adolescents are expanding their
wings of freedom"9 in decision-making in a way heretofore thought
unimaginable, and, as a result, are encountering legal constraints as
varied as the social and medical situations facing them. Indeed, the
health care arena vividly illustrates a dichotomy of law and social
thought that acutely heightens awareness about legal reform
regarding adolescence. Underscoring this social-legal dichotomy,
Professor Angela Holder explains:
Social customs have undergone significant change within the past
30 years, and teenagers are much more independent in all areas of
their lives... [A]dolescents are engaging in more 'adult' behaviors
than many of the health care professionals caring for them would
have believed possible during their own adolescent years. The
courts and legislatures of this country have not been unmindful of
these societal changes, and there is a definite trend toward allowing
adolescents more freedom to make decisions, and to exercise
autonomy and self-determination in their relationships with health
care providers and with others in the social system.9
(1) Medical Treatment and Procedures
With regard to medical treatment and procedures, minors are
presumed incapable of decision-making and the consent of a parent
or legal guardian is required. In actual medical and legal practice, it
becomes more complicated, especially due to the exceptions that
confound this seemingly straightforward rule. As Professor Holder
has observed, "the question of what to do with the young person of
13, 14, 15, or 16 years of age who requests treatment is becoming a
190. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care:
Physician Perceptions and Practices, 8 U. CI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE (forthcoming 2001)
(analyzing a scientific study of physician perceptions of adolescent patients, and
addressing the implications of the results).
191. See DYLAN THOMAS, Children of Darkness Got No Wings, in THE POEMS OF
DYLAN THOMAS (Daniel Jones ed., 1971).
192. Angela R. Holder, Minors' Rights to Consent to Medical Care, 257 JAMA 3400,
3400, 3402 (1987).
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problem for many physicians. ' ' One exception is emancipation,
generally defined as the freedom or liberty of one who had previously
been under the power and control of another."9 Emancipation for
medical care statutes demarcate circumstances that free the
adolescent from a parent or guardian's control, including marriage,
military enlistment, and independent living (presumably not only a
self-supporting college student but also a runaway).95 However,
ascertaining each of the categories with confidence can be
problematic for a medical practitioner. If the adolescent continues as
a patient and wishes to consent to treatment, the physician must once
again assess de novo the status of emancipation. Even more
problematic and impractical is the ill-defined phrase found in several
emancipation statutes, "has been pregnant." ' 96  Precisely how this
phrase is to be accurately determined and whether it means that the
adolescent must actually be a parent in order to be emancipated is left
to endless speculation. Understandably, these interpretative
questions not only cause concern and consternation for physicians
practicing adolescent medicine, but deserve thoughtful and careful
scrutiny by legal policy makers.
Adding to the confusion are several other exceptions to the rule
of decisional incapacity, including an adolescent's ability to consent to
treatment for drug, alcohol, and sexually transmitted diseases," a
relic of the early 1960's when adolescents were found to be the
primary culprit for the spread of STDs. The underlying policy stems
193. ANGELA R. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT
MEDICINE 123 (2d ed. 1985). Also cognizant of this quandary are Sigman & O'Connor,
supra note 188 (observing that "[t]he question 'Should I grant my adolescent patient
autonomous decision-making rights?' (the ethical question) must then be followed by the
question 'May I grant my adolescent patient decision-making rights under the law?"').
194. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (6th ed. 1990). Providing insight into the
'emancipation exception,' including the impact on adolescents and their interests, by
tracking emancipation under California law, are Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen,
Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modem Times, 25 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 239,
244 (1992) (commenting that "[s]tatutory emancipation is an extraordinary grant of
authority to minors in a legal system where even older children are permitted to decide
very little for themselves").
195. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.6 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12F (2000);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.6-1 (2000).
196. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101 (1999).
197. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-102 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1065.1, :1096
(West 2000); MD. CODE ANN,, FAM. LAW §§ 20-102(C)(1)-(3) (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
35 § 521.14a (1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2969(D)(1), (3) (Michie 2000).
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from a desire to encourage adolescents to obtain treatment without
the deterrent effect of having to inform a parent and to protect
adolescents who might be the victim of an abusive environment.' 9'
Even this seemingly straightforward statutory provision generates
uncertainty among physicians. Consider the following scenario. A
young woman, age 16 presents herself at a hospital with symptoms
related to a sexually transmitted disease. Under the law of most
states, the physician may provide treatment without contacting the
parent. A routine test given to the adolescent for STD detection also
reveals an abnormality that may require a biopsy. In all likelihood,
the abnormality may simply be a result of the STD; there is a
possibility, however, that the abnormality is an indication of a more
serious medical problem. Should the treating physician consider the
biopsy as an extension of the STD treatment, thereby allowing
adolescent consent for the procedure, or should the physician
perceive this complication as a development outside the scope of the
STD exception? There is no clear answer in law, which leaves
physicians to determine their course with legal vulnerability.1'
Moreover, statutory law granting decisional authority to
adolescents has been enacted under auspices of "mature minor"
provisions, permitting "mature" adolescents to decide their own
health care treatment, even though the provisions lack a gauge for
determining "maturity." These statutes typically engraft an age
limitation, usually 14 or 15, and limit adolescent decisional autonomy
to consent, rather than refusal, of treatment.20 Louisiana is
exemplary, giving decisional carte blanche to an adolescent "who is or
believes himself to be afflicted with an illness or disease" by providing
that his consent shall be "valid and binding as if the minor had
achieved his majority." '  Adding that a physician or other member of
the health care team is not obligated to inform a parent or guardian
198. The public policy underlying the STD exception-eliminating barriers for
encouraging adolescents to obtain needed treatment-underscores the statutory allowance
of adolescents to obtain drug and alcohol treatment without the consent of a parent or
legal guardian.
199. In this precise situation, a group of physicians in Pittsburgh shared with me that
they were split in their judgment how to proceed with an adolescent patient; of course,
advice from Risk Management was to "get the parent's consent when in doubt," even
though several physicians thought this course ethically inappropriate.
200. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.640 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.14(14) (West
1999).
201. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1095 (West 2000).
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and cloaking the physician in civil and criminal immunity (except for
negligence), the legislators in Louisiana intended to empower minors
to seek medical treatment and advice without the necessity of prior
parental approval, in an attempt "to actively and positively encourage
the betterment of the health and welfare" of the citizenry. Despite
the liberal breadth of the law, which omits any age restriction to the
ability of a minor to consent to treatment, the corollary right to refuse
treatment is notably absent.2
As gleaned from the legislative record, the paramount
consideration in enacting these state statutes has been increasing
recognition of adolescent decisional ability in light of the opinions of
health care professionals who deem it appropriate to treat an
adolescent in the absence of parental or guardian authority. How a
mature minor is determined within the purview of this legislative
intent is disputable, and legislators have not provided any guidance
to physicians other than somewhat arbitrary age restrictions. While
the end may be laudable, the means are problematic. In other words,
the same public policies accompanying the exceptions may be more
meaningfully furthered by a coherent rule of law that focuses on
adolescent decisional autonomy.
Moreover, the "mature minor" doctrine derived from common
law is a misnomer. A doctrine is a rule of law established by a
consensus of judicial decisions; however, several courts have simply
ruled in specific situations that the adolescent presented to the court
was either able or unable to choose or refuse medical treatment.
Cardwell v. Bechtol, involving 17-year-old Sandra Cardwell who had
never regained complete sensation of her lower extremities after she
sought treatment from a licensed osteopath for her back pain,
explicates the point.' The lawsuit filed by Sandra and her parents
involved claims of medical malpractice, lack of informed consent, and
battery. The Tennessee trial court granted a directed verdict as to
medical malpractice, and the jury rendered verdicts in favor of the
202. See Op. La. Att'y Gen. No. 88-232 (1988).
203. 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987). The record indicates that, after exploring traditional
but relatively unsuccessful treatment attempts, Sandra decided to visit the osteopath, with
whom she was familiar because he had previously treated her father. See id. at 741. The
osteopath treated her "with manipulations involving her neck, spine, and legs for
subluxation of the spine and bilateral sacroiliac slip disc." Id Within hours of this
treatment, she experienced a numbing sensation in her legs and intense pain, necessitating
hospitalization. See iL at 742.
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defendant on the theories of battery and lack of informed consent.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the battery theory, finding error in
the trial court's instruction to the jury to consider whether Sandra was
a "mature minor." The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed,
reinstating the judgment of the trial court.' In so doing, the court
found that Sandra could be considered a "mature minor," based on
the totality of the circumstances, which included her age, ability,
experience, education, training, degree of mature judgment, nature of
treatment, risks, probable consequences, and her ability to appreciate
those risks and consequences.2°5 Relying on the "rule of sevens" as a
barometer, the court stated that "a rebuttable presumption of
capacity does arise" between the ages of fourteen and eighteen2
Notably, the Tennessee Supreme Court did not declare that all
adolescents in that age bracket warrant this "rebuttable presumption"
but carefully circumscribed its ruling by not altering the general
requirement of parental consent for an adolescent's medical
treatment. Indeed, the court emphasized that the ruling "was by no
means a general license to treat minors without parental consent and
its application depends on the facts of each case."
Cardwell is actually apparitional in the genre of "mature minor"
cases, which usually focus on an adolescent's refusal of treatment,
rather than consent to treatment. Nevertheless, the same inadequate
ad hoc approach prevails, as courts carefully countenance decisions
by concise circumstances, thereby providing scant guidance to
medical practitioners, attorneys, and judges who grapple with these
issues. Indeed, Matter of Rena, In re E.G., Application of Long Island
Jewish Medical Center, and Novak v. Cobb County-Keenstone
Hospital Authority aptly illustrate the inconsistent analytical
approaches to adolescent refusal of treatment. Beyond illustrating
the labyrinth of law guiding adolescent refusal of medical treatment,
these decisions present an intriguing opportunity for contrasts and
comparisons, because each involve an older adolescent who believed
in the teaching of Jehovah's Witness and refused medical treatment in
the form of a blood transfusion. Because similar situations spawn
varying dispositions, they warrant scrutiny.
204. See id at 756.
205. Id. at 748.
206. Id. at 749.
207. Id
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When 17-year-old Alexis Demos refused a blood transfusion
following a January 1999 snowboarding accident that lacerated her
spleen, Berkshire Medical Center in Massachusetts initiated
declaratory relief in Superior Court, seeking authority to administer
treatment." Vacating the order authorizing treatment on mootness
grounds, the Massachusetts Appeals Court nonetheless found error
by the hearing judge for failing to assess Alexis' maturity to make an
informed choice. The court explained that the judge "should not have
relied solely on the representations made by her attorney and her
parents," but should have heard from Alexis "where she apparently
had the testimonial capacity to answer questions."' This testimony,
according to the court, was a liaison to determining "her best
interests.""2 '
Like Alexis Demos, 17-year-old Ernestine Gregory, afflicted
with leukemia, wished to forego the life-sustaining measure of a
blood transfusion. Despite her refusal, physicians treated her. With
the assent of her mother, Ernestine remained resolute in her refusal
due to her chosen spiritual faith as a Jehovah's Witness, and claimed
that treatment contravened the exercise of her religious tenets under
the First Amendment.2 1 ' Although Ernestine attained majority during
the litigation of the matter, the Illinois Supreme Court, characterizing
the issue as one of "substantial public interest," determined that
Ernestine possessed the right to refuse this medical treatment.212
Declaring age 18 as indeterminate for autonomous decision-making,
the court was disinclined to favorably weigh the state parens patriae
interest, which "fades... as the minor gets older and disappears upon
her reaching adulthood," though the court strove to preserve parens
patriae as a viable state power 3 The court found such state power
strong only "when the minor is immature and thus incompetent
(lacking in capacity) to make these decisions on her own."
Accordingly, the court characterized Ernestine as a mature minor and
208. See In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (Mass. 1999). "Rena" was used by the
appellate court as a pseudonym for Alexis Demos. See id at 1156 n.1.
209. d at 1157.
210. Id.
211. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322,323-24 (111. 1989).
212. Id. at 325-28.
213. Id. at 326-28.
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ruled that she could decline medical care based upon her "sincerely
held religious beliefs.,
214
A different result ensued in the New York Supreme Court in
Application of Long Island Jewish Medical Center.215 Before the court
was Philip Malcolm, then 17 years and 11 months, whose blood count
was dangerously anemic and who was battling tissue cancer.
Physicians at the medical center determined that a blood transfusion
was medically appropriate to prolong Philip's life; although the cure
rate remained at less than 50 percent, a transfusion provided an
optimal chance for temporary remission.216  Without invasive
treatment, including the blood transfusion, doctors determined that
Philip would die in pain. Philip, however, refused the treatment, as
he, his mother, and stepfather adamantly adhered to the tenets and
teachings of Jehovah's Witness. The refusal prompted the attending
physician and the hospital to petition the state court for an order to
treat Philip over his objection. Following two hearings on the matter,
the judge authorized the transfusion, despite Philip's expressed desire
not to be transfused. The judge, citing parens patriae and "varying
degrees of [adolescent] maturity and responsibility (capacity),"
estimated that Philip was not a mature minor. However, the judge did
urge the state legislature and appellate courts to "take a hard look at
the 'mature minor' doctrine"1 for either statutory or decisional law
reform in New York.
Like Philip Malcolm, Gregory Novak, then 16, refused a blood
transfusion, causing consternation among the medical professionals
caring for him. Decided by a federal district court in Georgia, Novak
v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hospital Authority involved civil rights
allegations under Sections 1983 and 1985 that Gregory, who had been
seriously injured in an automobile accident, had been treated and
transfused in violation of his constitutional rights.2 18  Specifically,
when Gregory was emergent, he, along with his mother, June, refused
the transfusion, regardless of attempts by physicians to persuade them
otherwise.2 9 Shortly thereafter, the attending physician and hospital
filed a petition in a Georgia trial court, requesting appointment of a
214. See idL at 328.
215. 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
216. See id. at 241.
217. Id. at 243.
218. 849 F. Supp. 1559,1563-64 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
219. See iL at 1563.
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guardian ad litem, which the court granted. The trial court conducted
two hearings on the issue; notably absent from the hearings were
Gregory and June, who were not given advance notice.' As a result
of the trial court's determination that Gregory could not refuse
treatment, physicians physically restrained him in order to transfuse
him." In the civil rights action that followed, Gregory and June
claimed that, under color of state authority, the physicians and
hospital violated Gregory's due process, equal protection, and
freedom to exercise religion guarantees under the federal
Constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which
the federal district court granted, finding no genuine issue of material
fact in dispute.'
With respect to the due process allegations, the court
determined, without detailed analysis, that a lack of notice and
opportunity to be heard in an emergent situation necessitating
unwanted blood transfusions did not infringe Gregory's constitutional
right to a fundamentally fair process. ' The court similarly and
summarily disposed of the substantive due process and first
amendment claims, finding that only adults possess a right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, that Gregory "was an adult at no time
relevant" to the court's determination, 24 and that "most children,
even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments
concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment." ' According to the federal district court, the equal
protection claim likewise raised no issue of triable fact, because no
evidence was proffered pertaining to how Gregory was similarly
situated to others, but subjected to disparate state action.226
From Alexis Demos and Ernestine Gregory to Philip Malcolm
and Gregory Novak, the threshold issue was whether each of these
adolescents possessed decisional capacity. Yet, in all four cases, the
220. See id.
221. Cf. George J. Annas, The Last Resort- The Use of Physical Restraints in Medical
Emergencies, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1408, 1411 (1999) ("It is never appropriate to
restrain a competent patient against his or her will solely because he or she is refusing
treatment recommended by a physician.").
222. See Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1580 (dismissing the state law claims without
prejudice).
223. See id. at 1567-71.
224. IdM at 1574.
225. Id. at 1575.
226. See id. at 1572.
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courts either summarily disposed of the issue or declined to consider
it. The decision in Novak, for instance, is replete with factual
discrepancies, a disturbing irony since the court was directed by the
summary judgment standard to view the evidence and inferences in a
light most favorable to Gregory as the nonmoving party. Indeed, the
court's framing and disposition of the legal issues is skewed by an
incomplete evidentiary record, which failed to sufficiently inform the
court of the factual issues involved. For instance, the concept of
"mature minor" that peppers the opinion raises factual issues, notably
what constitutes a mature minor, how is maturity determined, and
who should determine it.' Rather than recognizing the magnitude of
the factual inquiries as they related to the constitutional issues at
stake, the court cursorily declared that most adolescents are unable to
exercise sound judgment in decision-making2  and that an ex parte
guardian ad litem, who ultimately persuaded the trial court to
override Gregory's treatment objections, was appropriately appointed
by that court. m These legal points raise important factual inquiries
overlooked by the federal district court and possibly the attorneys
who briefed the issues for the court's consideration. The equal
protection issue alone was laden with factual inquiry, including
whether legislative line-drawing by the Georgia legislature-
separating adolescents from adults for recognizing autonomous
medical decision-making-was arbitrary in light of scientific evidence
suggesting decisional ability of adolescents. In addition, the court's
reasoning that "if minors possess the power to consent or refuse
medical treatment then there would be no need for statutory
exceptions" is both fallacious and double-edged of the ilk Professor
Tribe posited when he assessed that legal treatment of adolescent
ability for decision-making "cuts both ways. '' m Moreover, the New
York court's appraisal of a "mature minor" was less than inspiring
and perhaps impaired by the court's disavowal of decisional capacity.
227. See generally Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739,739 (Tenn. 1987).
228. See Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. at 1575.
229. Id. at 1572-74.
230. Tribe, supra note 187, at 199 and accompanying text. Accord Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d
at 744 (acknowledging statutory exceptions as "no indication.., of any intent on the part
of the Legislature to establish a comprehensive statutory scheme to occupy the area of
medical treatment of minors in its entirety" and further finding that such statutes "do
nothing more than provide conditional immunity from certain types of liability in specific
situations ... or promote certain social policies").
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The court deemed Philip Malcolm an immature minor, without
defining-or even attempting to define-maturity."' While the
Massachusetts appellate court expressly recognized the "testimonial
capacity" of Alexis to articulate her reasons for refusing treatment, it
distilled her "mature decision" as merely one factor in finessing her
best interests. And, although the Illinois Supreme Court
acknowledged Ernestine Gregory's ability to maturely decide to
refuse the blood transfusion, it carefully and cautiously circumscribed
its ruling to the particular adolescent and situation presented to it. 2
By not squarely addressing the issue of adolescent decisional
ability, the courts in each of these cases, along with courts in other
states,33 have yet to render any concrete and cohesive guidance for
physicians, hospitals, and attorneys confronted with adolescent choice
or refusal of treatment. Consequently, no consensus emerges that
may legitimately constitute a "mature minor" doctrine. Indeed, the
only consensus is that, like the courts themselves, practitioners are
left to struggle with these issues on a case-by-case approach.
Exacerbating this point is the practical reality that physicians
have difficulty even when operating under a governing legal
consensus. For example, adult patient noncompliance with physician
recommendations may prompt a competency assessment, posing not
only legal but ethical concerns.' If Alexis Demos, Ernestine
231. Cf. Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill
Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor
Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1204 (1996) ("Courts will not even embark on a
maturity evaluation unless a finding of maturity will in some way serve the best interests
of the minor.").
232. See also Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 749.
233. See, e.g., In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (precluding medical treatment
for 16-year-old Ricky Green, while acknowledging legal recognition of adolescent
decisional capacity in instances of custody, constitutional waiver, and personal injury
standing to conclude it "anomolous" not to recognize that a 16-year-old adolescent
possesses ability for decision-making).
234. For a thoughtful discussion of decision-making in clinical practice, see Dan W.
Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1595 (1990). While tauting the conducive environment created when
patients and physicians collaborate in making decisions about medical care, Drs. Brock
and Wartman warn that physicians should "bear in mind that even truly irrational choices
are not sufficient to establish a patient's incompetence and to justify overriding them." Id.
at 1599. See also Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 16, at 1638 (admonishing physicians
who conclude that "uncooperative patients are probably incompetent [as] clearly wrong
and would lead to overriding the wishes of some competent patients"). This cautionary
warning may likewise be appropriately applied to physicians caring for adolescent
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Gregory, Philip Malcolm, or Gregory Novak would have consented to
the blood transfusion on a misinformed basis, it is unlikely that the
consent would have been challenged. With adolescent patients, the
temptation to treat in the absence of patient consent may be
especially acute and inapposite to self-determination, thereby
disparaging the value of individual dignity which is at the heart when
honoring the autonomous decision-making of any person, adult or
adolescent.
Several studies suggest that adolescents are rather thorough and
thoughtful about their choices in health care. The Journal of the
American Medical Association published a study by six researchers
that asked adolescents to identify characteristics in a health care
provider that affect their decision to seek medical care. 5 The study
population consisted of a cross-section of 6,821 ninth graders (aged 14
through 16) from the Philadelphia public school system, who
responded over a ten month period by open-ended oral discussion
and by written survey. 6 The researchers report a high level of
thoughtful and mature perceptions by adolescents, enabling the
researchers to clarify which variables influence their decisions to seek
medical care. The influential variables include providers who are
skilled in adolescent care, competent, compassionate, unpretentious,
nonjudgmental, and willing to respect confidentiality.' The
adolescent study respondents further expressed that respect by
providers toward adolescent patients was paramount, demonstrated
by clear communication, candor, sensitivity toward individual needs,
and equal treatment. 3 8 This particular finding is further supported by
a published study in the Journal of Adolescent Health, whose results
"highlight the independent effect that health care providers'
interpersonal style can have on adolescent patient satisfaction,"
similar to that of adult patients.23'
patients.
235. Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Adolescents' Perceptions of Factors Affecting Their
Decisions to Seek Health Care, 273 JAMA 1913 (1995).
236. See id. at 1913-14.
237. See id. at 1917. In fact, the researchers found confidentiality an important variable
resulting in perceived decency and dignity for the adolescents. See id
238. See id.
239. Lorraine H. Freed et al., Determinants of Adolescents' Satisfaction with Health
Care Providers and Intentions to Keep Follow-Up Appointments, 22 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 475, 478 (1998). The researchers surveyed by questionnaire 124 adolescent
patients of a university-based medical clinic for the purpose of better understanding "the
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Moreover, researchers have found that adolescents wish to chart
their own course within the health care system by visiting providers
on their own, exercising decision-making in medical care, and being
responsible for those decisions. According to researchers, this finding
"illustrates that adolescents are not passive recipients of care. They
actively interpret interactions and evaluate services." 2"° Reporting
that the findings indicate a reciprocal element to the health care
system, researchers urge adolescents to become more actively
involved in health care, which in turn would better serve "the needs
and ultimately improve the health status of youth."241  Other
researchers have also found that acknowledging the self-
determination of adolescents in routine medical decision-making is
therapeutic by "improv[ing] their response to treatment and
encourag[ing] the development of self-efficacy. 242 According to the
results of a study focusing on voluntariness in medical decision-
making comparing children, adolescents, and young adults, Professor
David G. Scherer found that adolescents and young adults appeared
to approach "medical decision-making with a quality of intentionality
that is not seen in the decisions made by children."'243 Professor
Scherer further found that "older adolescents appear to be
comparable to young adults in their reactions to parental influence in
some medical treatment decision circumstances," suggesting "that
older adolescents should not be excluded from making treatment
decisions on the presumption that they lack the requisite capacities
for volition."2" Professor Scherer underscored the import of these
findings, stating "there is no conclusive evidence to presume that
adolescents are incapable of a voluntary consent comparable to that
of young adults."245 Several years earlier, Professor Scherer and N.
Dickon Reppucci measured the volition of adolescents in decision-
making and found that the nature of a treatment decision greatly
determinants of adolescents' satisfaction with their health care providers and to examine
the relationship among satisfaction, intention to return for follow-up, and appointment-
keeping behavior." Id. at 475.
240. Ginsburg et al., supra note 235, at 1918.
241. Id. at 1918. See also Kenneth R. Ginsburg et al., Factors Affecting the Decision to
Seek Health Care: The Voice of Adolescents, 100 PEDIATRICS 922, 922 (1997).
242. David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical
Treatment Decisions, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 431,446 (1991).
243. Id. at 444.
244. 1d at 445.
245. Id. at 446.
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impacts the quality of an adolescent's response to parental influence:
"Adolescents are more likely to resist parental influence when the
consequence or gravity of the decision has serious implications for the
adolescent's health."246
Last, but notably not least, is the seminal study published by Lois
Weithorn and Susan Campbell who studied 96 participants ages 9, 14,
18, and 21 to determine developmental differences in medical
decisional capacity.' Specifically, they compared the decision-
making ability among young adults, adolescents, and children, and
found that, in contrast to the 9-year-olds, the 14-year-old adolescents
reasoned about medical decisions in much the same way as the young
adults. They further found that children as young as nine appear able
to participate meaningfully in their health care decisions.2 The
investigators concluded that their findings are consistent with Piaget
cognitive development theory, which predicts that, by the age of 14,
minors reach a stage of formal operational thinking that allows them
to reason hypothetically.249 The authors take the position that their
results do not support the denial of adolescent self-determination in
health care situations.' This research confirms earlier preliminary
findings that there is "little evidence that minors age 15 and above as
a group are any less competent to provide consent than are adults.""
The fact that scientific and social science research suggests no
perceptible difference between the capacity of adolescents and young
adults in medical treatment decision-making indicates that the law
should refrain from capriciously constructing a dichotomy of
presumptive differences in decisional autonomy.
246. David G. Scherer & N. Dickton Reppucci, Adolescents' Capacities to Provide
Voluntary Informed Consent: The Effects of Parental Influence and Medical Dilemmas, 12
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 123, 136 (1988). The researchers studied 40 adolescents, evenly
divided between gender aged 14 and 15, who responded to hypothetical treatment
decisions, and measured whether adolescents exhibit a loss of conviction in their own
treatment choice and tend to adhere to parental directives as parents' influence attempts
become increasingly coercive. See id. at 128-29.
247. Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and
Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589,1589 (1982).
248. See iL at 1591-95.
249. See also supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
250. See Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 247, at 1595.
251. See Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minor's Consent to Treatment: A
Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCH. 412,423 (1978).
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(2) End of Life Decision-making
Confronting a chronic and/or terminal illness is challenging and
poses a conundrum where adolescents are concerned. Particularly, if
a 16-year-old adolescent patient has undertaken the surgery and
treatment usually accompanying a cancer diagnosis and now wishes to
halt the continuum of treatment, should that adolescent be able to
make that decision? And, if that same adolescent executes an
advance directive, either a living will or durable power of attorney in
health care, should the advance directive be honored? Although the
law requires the parent or legal guardian to decide because of the
patient's minor status, many physicians view their decision to honor
the adolescent's choice as ethical because of principles of individual
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. 2  The
adolescent's execution of a durable power of attorney may
conceivably identify only one parent or a nonfamily member whom
the adolescent believes understands his values and would be able to
effectuate those wishes should the adolescent become incapacitated.
Also deserving of attention in this context is the appropriate
decisional standard to be employed (substituted judgment or best
interests) and the import of the surrogate designation to the
decisional process.
Moreover, in a medical situation where recommended treatment
prolongs suffering with a low threshold of therapeutic value, it would
seem to be most beneficial and least harmful to the patient to honor a
refusal of treatment decision, thereby according dignity to the
individual. If the adolescent's decision to refuse treatment is
respected from an ethical stance, then it follows that a written
expression of those wishes through a living will should likewise be
honored. The legal aspect of this question presents further
challenges, as Robert Weir and Charles Peter powerfully point out:
"Even if most adolescents between age fourteen and seventeen
increasingly are regarded as having the capacity to make health
decisions for themselves, and even if leading pediatric groups have for
over twenty years called for an expansion of adolescent rights in
health care settings, important questions about the law remain.""
252. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3.
253. Robert F. Weir & Charles Peters, Affirming the Decisions Adolescents Make about
Life and Death, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 32-33 (1997). See Sally L. Webb et al.,
Refusal of Treatment by an Adolescent. The Deliverances of Different Consciences, 10
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In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan,
Congress enacted the Patient Self-Determination Act, which
established a national policy recognizing autonomous rights in health
care. The Act essentially furthers two goals: to ensure that
individuals are informed of their right to direct their own health care
through advance directives and to enable the states to enact
legislation protecting those rights. As enabling legislation, the Act
defers to state judgment on the logistics of statutory law, including the
conditions and procedures for implementation as well as -which
persons are able to execute advance directives. Under state advance
directive in health care legislation, the right to execute advance
directives is cryptically reserved for competent adults. The
Pennsylvania Advance Directive in Health Care Act is instructive:
"[A]n individual of sound mind who is 18 years or older or who has
graduated from high school or has married may execute at any time a
declaration governing the initiation, continuation, withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. '  Notably, the language
itself, which tracks a provision from the Commonwealth's
emancipation statute, portends advance directive recognition for an
adolescent, especially if one focuses upon the spirit of the law,"
which is to alleviate individual suffering and preserve personal dignity
when medical treatment and technology would only serve to prolong
the dying process. 6
HosP. ETHICS COMMiTTEE F. 9 (1998).
254. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5404 (West 1994). The statute governing Durable
Powers of Attorney does not distinguish even competent adults, but rather a principal who
may execute a durable power of attorney. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5604 (West
1994). The only caveat affecting the enforceability of the durable power of attorney is the
adjudication of the principal's incapacity. Minors are presumed to lack decisional
capacity, raising the question whether their execution of a durable power of attorney is
either de jure or de facto ineffective subject to adjudicatory proceedings.
255. See also Mary Ann McCabe et al., Implications of the Patient Self-Determination
Act: Guidelines for Involving Adolescents in Medical Decisionmaking, 19 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 319, 320 (1996) (assessing that "[w]hile most minors do not have the legal rights
or protections of the PSDA, their interests in self-determination appear to be well served
by this legislation"). There is state decisional law support for this proposition. See, e.g., In
re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 636 n.4 (Mich. App. 1992) (advising that a minor's advance
directive "should be taken into consideration or enforced when deciding whether to
terminate the minor's life-support treatment or refuse medical treatment").
256. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5402 (West 1994). This interpretation, of course,
underscores an overriding, yet overlooked basic tenet, that silence in law should not
prevent one from proceeding.
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Once again, capacity is the crux; if an adolescent is deemed
capable of decision-making, then that same adolescent should be able
to enjoy the same legal protection for memorializing those wishes. A
barrier, though not impenetrable, has been state legislatures, which:
[S]eem to think that adolescents either do not die in clinical
settings, or are incapable of making informed consent or refusal
decisions about treatment options, and must be protected from
their own lack of judgment, or simply should not be permitted to
give legally binding advance directions regarding life-sustaining
treatments and surrogate decision-makers' 7
Seeking to penetrate the legislative barrier, Lisa Anne Hawkins
thoughtfully contends that minors should be legally protected when
indicating wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment. She reasons
that "affording minors increased decision making autonomy may
actually be in their best interests."2' She concludes that "living wills
executed by minors, with the written concurrence of their parent(s)
and physician should be given the same legal effect as those executed
by competent adults." Her conclusion indicates that minors would be
empowered to effectuate their interests and gain a greater sense of
control "to help counter the negative psychological ramifications of
terminal illness." Further, a living will would facilitate familial unity,
which contributes to one's ability to cope with a grave illness, and it
would "alleviate the difficult position of parents and physicians-as
well as courts-when such an advance directive is absent." "
From an ethical standpoint, Ms. Hawkins' view complements the
core values of autonomy and beneficence; indeed, the American
Academy of Pediatrics position statement on ethical responsibility
encourages physicians to honor an adolescent's refusal of treatment
with the assent of a parent or guardian.2 ° From a legal standpoint,
257. Weir & Peters, supra note 253, at 33-34. See also Sanford Leikin, A Proposal
Concerning Decisions to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment for Young People, 115 J.
PEDIATRICS 17, 20 (1989) (imparting the consensus among pediatric clinicians and
psychologists that adolescents understand the meaning of death by age 14).
258. Lisa Anne Hawkins, Note, Living-Will Statutes: A Minor Oversight, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1581, 1592 (1992).
259. Id at 1613.
260. See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 189, at 315-16. The American Academy
of Pediatrics emphasizes the effectiveness of candid communication for relieving distress,
which provides support and personal growth during the final phases of a child's or
adolescent's life. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics,
Palliative Care for Children, 106 PEDIATRICS 351 (2000); American Academy of
Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Guidelines on Foregoing Life-Sustaining Medical
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her proposal for legislative reform, recognizing the right of
adolescents to execute living wills, is consistent with the trend toward
recognizing adolescent autonomy in other realms of the law.
However, the suggested proposal, by requiring the concurrence of
parents and physicians, may, in effect, diminish the autonomous
wishes of the adolescent.
Regrettably, the much overlooked, though irrefutable, purpose
of advance directives is communication-communication of one's
values and wishes to trusted persons about what medical treatment
one would want, regardless of what others may think would be best.
Conceptually, this communication furthers a measure of individual
autonomy by allowing one to direct and control health care at a point
when no longer able to do so consciously. The importance of
communication in this context should not be mitigated by minority
status. Accordingly, the ability to execute a living will may provide
the adolescent with a measure of empowerment during this very
difficult time by prompting the exploration of the adolescent's own
values with family members. This would give the adolescent a more
complete sense of being heard and understood, as well as considering
the views of parents and other closely related people in the
adolescent's life. A writing reflects a genuine desire and intent that
should invite honor and respect. Such a written memorial of desires
and intentions may also more fully guarantee that the adolescent's
wishes will be respected because communication with the family and
the physician during the process of the writing is likely to have
occurred. Requiring the concurrence of parents and physicians may
thwart the ideal of an advance directive by exalting form over
substance-the discussion itself may be absent though everyone
involved may agree.
In cases of conflict, moreover, an adolescent's ability to
communicate and execute a legally valid advance directive could
clarify the physician's role, especially a physician ethically inclined
toward respecting the adolescent's wishes, despite parental objection.
Cases of conflict also suggest recourse beyond ethics consults and
committees to courts, and raise the issue of professional responsibility
for attorneys who may petition courts for a declaration of an
adolescent's right to have his or her advance directive honored.
Criticizing the law relating to adolescents as "focused not on their
Treatment, 93 PEDIATRICS 532 (1994).
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rights but on the rights of adults," another commentator contends
that the appropriate role for legal counsel is that of an advocate,
especially in medical treatment cases.21 In fact, the argument that
adolescents are prone to foolhardy decisions may be debunked as
mounting studies demonstrate. Certainly, "adolescents do not have a
monopoly on foolish or ill-advised decisions." 262
Several other commentators contribute thoughtful resolutions to
discourse regarding end-of-life decision-making for adolescent
patients.0 Professor Jennifer Rosato's comment that "the length of a
person's life should not affect the value of that person's choice to live
in a particular way" strikes a significant and sensitive cord regarding
the ability of adolescents to direct their care at any stage, especially in
the final stages of life. Like Lisa Hawkins, Professor Rosato proposes
legislative revision to existing advance directive in health care statutes
to include terminally ill minors necessitating parental permission.6
4
While I depart from Professor Rosato's approach to honoring end-of-
life wishes by adolescents, for many of the same reasons I discussed
with relation to the Hawkins proposal265 her view that the "harm
inflicted upon [adolescents'] personhoods is irreparable when they
are forced to receive life-sustaining treatment" and that her suggested
approach is "better than the current law" cannot be disputed 66
261. Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent Minors
in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075,2076 (1996).
262. Weir & Peters, supra note 253, at 37.
263. See Mary Ann McCabe, supra note 255.
264. See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatment?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1
(1996).
265. Professor Rosato believes the law should allow adolescents "to exercise their right
to self-determination when they are sufficiently mature and when the state's interest is not
strong enough to circumscribe the minor's right." If- at 102-03. While I applaud her
thoughtful effort, this suggestion seems unworkable, especially from an autonomous
decision-making framework, because identifying the state's interests and weighing those
interests invite enormous subjective evaluation of judges, along with the parties involved,
that may ultimately thwart the very concept of recognizing and respecting adolescent
decisional autonomy.
266. ld. at 103. News reports are replete with adolescents who have experienced
psychological and emotional harm when their decisions to refuse medical treatment are
disregarded. See John Ritter, Mass Teen on the Run-From Chemotherapy, USA TODAY,
Nov. 11, 1994, at 8A (reporting about 16-year-old Billy Best who desperately fled to
escape chemotherapy for cancer). See, e.g., Francie Latour, Standing Up For Beliefs:
Lenox Minor Deems Ruling a Major Victory, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 19, 1999, at BI
(reporting on 17-year-old Alexis Demos' successful attempt to persuade a Massachusetts
appellate court to allow her to reject a blood transfusion following a snowboarding
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Indeed, statutes protecting an adult's determination of medical
care, including the decision to forego life-sustaining treatment, do
not refer to adolescents. The few states that have special statutory
mechanisms for mature minors do not address an adolescent's ability
to refuse life-sustaining treatment or technology. Guidelines are also
lacking with regard to caring for the specific emotional and
psychological needs of a dying adolescent, including existential and
physiological pain. Likewise, the legal principles governing surrogate
decision-making, particularly where a patient has not memorialized or
communicated his or her wishes, shun reference to adolescence. In
the absence of an advance directive, a surrogate will decide health
care for an incapacitated adult patient by substituted judgment. With
respect to adolescents, the question is whether a parent, for example,
as a surrogate decision-maker, should direct the care based on his or
her conception of best interests for the adolescent or by a substituted
judgment assessment-i.e., how the adolescent patient would decide
and direct the care.
The few courts that have addressed this issue have utilized a
composite of best interests and substituted judgment, according
dispositive weight to the express wishes of the adolescent. In re Swan
involved 17-year-old Chad Swan, who had been tragically disabled in
an automobile accident that left him in a persistent vegetative state.
267
Although Chad had not expressed his wishes in writing, he had
commented to family members one year previously what he would
like done for him if he was ever in such condition. A petition was
filed by Chad's parents and brother with the trial court in Maine for a
declaration that a gastrostomy tube providing nutrition and hydration
not be reinserted because Chad's body had rejected initial attempts to
accident based upon her religious beliefs); Catherine Dunphy, They Must Have Cared A
Lot To Fight Me So Hard, THE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 12, 1998, at F1 (reporting about 13-
year-old Tarin Hughes who disagreed with medical treatment available to her, hired an
attorney, and held accountable in law the Hospital for Sick Children for the treatment she
desired); Barbara Walsh, HRS Defends Taking Boy From Home, SUN-SENTINEL, June 28,
1994, at 1B (reporting about 15-year-old Benny Agrelo who, with his mother's assent,
refused to take post-liver transplantation medication); Bernard Levin, Solomon Himself
Would Have Wept, LONDON TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at 14 (reporting about mentally disabled
15-year-old who refused injection of drugs due to severe side-effects). Accord Stacy A.
Teicher, When Minors Refuse Medical Treatment, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Feb. 9, 1999, at 3.
267. 569 A.2d 1202,1202-03 (Me. 1990).
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insert it.' Affirming the Superior Court's ruling that the tube need
not be reinserted, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was
convinced by the testimony of Chad's mother and brother that, on
two separate occasions prior to his accident, Chad had commented
that he would not want to be artificially maintained with medical
treatment but preferred to "be let go... in peace." '69 That Chad had
uttered these remarks before age 18 was determined by the state high
court "at most a factor to be considered by the fact finder in assessing
the seriousness and deliberateness with which his declarations were
made."'27  The record was devoid of any extra-judicial evidence
supporting a finding of adolescent decisional capacity, although the
court reasoned that "[c]apacity exists when the minor has the ability
of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits"
without age restrictionsY' Remarkably, the court concluded that its
decision in Chad Swan's case "rest[ed] ... on Chad's own conclusion
and not on any theory of substituted judgment."2'
One may reasonably interpret the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court's opinion as according respect and dignity to the wishes and
personal values of the adolescent patient, although disinclined to
include adolescent patients within the substituted judgment standard
that governs surrogate decision-making on behalf of adult patients. If
the law embraces a concept of adolescent autonomous decisional
ability, then the family should decide in the absence of express patient
directive by substituted judgment-i.e., how the adolescent would
268. See id.
269. Id. at 1205. The court also heard testimony from Chad's physicians about his
diagnosis and prognosis, who described reinsertion of the tube as "a major surgical
procedure with attendant surgical risks heightened due to Chad's deterioration since the
first tube was inserted." l at 1203.
270. Id at 1205.
271. 1I (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 18, at 115 (5th ed. 1984)).
272. Id. at 1206. Considering the previous expressions of Dawn Crum in In re
Guardianship of Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio 1991), an Ohio Probate Court authorized
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from Dawn, who at 17 years was in a chronic
vegetative state caused by viral encephalitis. The application considered by the court had
been filed by her parents, who had been appointed co-guardians of Dawn. See id. at 877-
78. Granting the application in "the best interest of Dawn Crum," the court, nonetheless,
found persuasive evidence that Dawn, at 12-years-old had been exposed to a severely
handicapped individual and expressed her feelings that she would not want to live in a
severely handicapped situation. Id at 882. The court concluded that "if she were aware of
her present condition, [Dawn] would not want to remain in her current state." Id
August 2000] ADOLESCENT AUTONOMY
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
have made the decision, rather than the best interest standard
employed when making decisions on behalf of children. The Maine
high court reached an appropriate result but did so in a less direct
way.M
Addressing the issue whether to employ the substituted
judgment or best interest standard, the Michigan Court of Appeals
adopted substituted judgment as the appropriate standard "where a
patient was formerly competent or is a minor of mature judgment."'274
Joelle Rosebush, whose prognosis after a traffic accident was that she
would never regain consciousness or breathe on her own, was at issue
before the appellate court, which also noted that the instrumentality
of an advance directive executed by an adolescent "should be taken
into consideration or enforced" when deciding termination of
treatment at the end of life.' 5
Perhaps more common than adolescent persistent vegetative
states are serious chronic conditions that may suggest the
appropriateness of a Do Not Resuscitate Order ("DNR"). DNR
orders are routinely executed by adult patients or agreed to by
surrogate decision-makers, especially when the patient is neither
terminally ill nor permanently unconscious. The issue whether a
DNR order would be appropriate for a particular patient requires a
medical and ethical assessment. Whether an adolescent should be
able to direct that a DNR order be placed in his medical chart and
honored presents a legal dilemma. Notably, even with adult patients,
the use and implementation of DNR orders has posed practical
problems, including recognition of the DNR order itself from
individual members of a health care team, interpretation of the order
in precise situations and as applied to particular patients. Not
surprisingly, allowing an adolescent patient to initiate a DNR order
merits special consideration.
273. Other legal commentators envision a family-based model for medical situations in
which an adolescent is rendered in a comatose or permanently unconscious state, with the
legal "presumption in favor of the family's choice" that may be overcome only when there
is evidence adduced from treating physicians "that the family's choice is wrong." Paymon
M. Bidari, Note, An Incompetent Child's Right to Have Medical Treatment Terminated
When There is Uncontroverted Evidence that Medical Assistance is Futile, 17 J. Juv. L. 1, 3
(1996).
274. In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633,639 (Mich. App. 1992).
275. Id. at 636 n.4.
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Several state courts considering the issue, however, cast more
heat than light on whether DNR orders for adolescents should be
recognized and followed. Reported decisions dealing with this issue
are remote and rare. Of the few decisions, the Supreme Courts of
Georgia and West Virginia, along with an intermediate appellate
court in Michigan, have tread with trepidation. However, in each of
these cases, the DNR decision-maker was not the adolescent patient,
but a parent. In a rather twisted application of legal principles, the
Georgia Supreme Court in In re Jane Doe rested its decision on
interpretation of the DNR statute, which presumes consent to
resuscitation, unless one parent objects 6  Curiously, under the
statute, the consent of one parent may be effectively revoked by the
other parent, which is what the Georgia high court found when Jane
Doe's mother agreed to the DNR order to deescalate treatment for
her 13-year-old terminally ill daughter. Although the daughter's
condition was degenerative, the father could not agree to a DNR
order.' The court did not consider the state interest in the sanctity of
life persuasive because the medical support system "was prolonging
her death, rather than her life." Consequently, the court incorporated
a substituted judgment standard, stating that the right to refuse
medical treatment is neither lost due to "youth [nor] the
incompetence of the patient." s
The West Virginia Supreme Court had to decide a situation
involving 17-year-old Larry Belcher Jr., who suffered from muscular
dystrophy. Unlike Georgia, the West Virginia high court found
reversible error in the circuit court's failure to instruct the jury
regarding a mature minor doctrine. In Belcher v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, Larry's parents had initiated a DNR order that Larry
not be reintubated or resuscitated in the event of respiratory failure,
unless Larry requested it. 9 However, neither the physicians nor the
parents spoke with Larry about the DNR order, which resulted in
Larry's death. In an action for wrongful death and lack of informed
consent, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found error by
the circuit court for not considering whether Larry's maturity
warranted his involvement in the DNR decision. The court noted no
276. 418 S.E.2d 3, 7 (Ga. 1992).
277. See id at 4-7.
278. d. at 5-6.
279. 422 S.E.2d 827, 830 (W. Va. 1992).
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"'hard and fast' rule that would provide a particular age for
determining" maturity and found legal recognition of involvement for
minors in medical decision-making a "more workable approach."
Interestingly, the judicially noticed observations in these
opinions may be subjected to scientific measurement, suggesting
important future research regarding the capacity of adolescents
struggling with critical illnesses and their desire for a DNR order. As
commentators Robert Weir and Charles Peters reason:
They have had, at the very least, multiple opportunities to think
about the inescapable suffering that characterizes their lives, the
features of life that make it worth continuing, the benefits and
burdens that accompany medical treatment, and the prospect of
death. At least some of these adolescents want to give voice to
their values, provide directions for parents, physicians, and nurses
regarding end-of-life care, and be assured that their wishes and
preferences will be respected and carried out should their medical
conditions deteriorate to the point that they will no longer be able
to communicate their deeply felt views. "
Unless we can differentiate degrees of dignity that should be
accorded to adults versus adolescents, then as commentators Weir
and Peters suggest, a DNR may offer a viable means for respecting
personal wishes and should be available to all decisionally capable
patients, whether adult or adolescent.
(3) Mental Health Treatment and Procedures
Mental health issues, as they relate to adolescents, bring a
measure of added complexity regarding in- and out-patient treatment,
as well as voluntary and involuntary civil commitment. Special
considerations, of course, are appropriate when a minor's liberty has
been curtailed by state action, whether incarceration or
institutionalization.' While adults may still be presumed to possess
decisional autonomy in these situations, consent for mental health
treatment by adolescents remains a capacity conundrum. With
respect to civil commitment, evidence suggests that allowing an
280. Id at 835, 837.
281. Weir & Peters, supra note 253, at 34.
282. See Abigail English, Treating Adolescents: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 74
ADOLESCENT MED. 1097, 1108 (1990) (citing financial and security interests of a
correctional system and a "delicate balancing of the need to involve [mentally
handicapped adolescents] in decisions about their own care while ensuring that
requirements of informed consent are satisfied").
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adolescent to direct his or her own care enhances the effect of
therapy, unless there is a professional assessment of diminished
capacity due to the mental disorder or illness. As with adults,
commitment to a mental health facility should not render
incompetent an adolescent who is otherwise decisionally capable.
Not surprisingly, state laws establishing civil commitment procedures
neither address nor provide specific guidance for the commitment of
adolescents, prompting several commentators to caution mental
health practitioners to tread carefully in order "to avoid charges of
malicious commitment or false imprisonment. "
Over twenty years ago, the California Supreme Court ruled in In
re Roger S. that adolescents aged 14 and older are entitled to a civil
commitment hearing before a neutral fact finder under due process
and equal protection guarantees of the United States and California
Constitutions, forecasting "increasing legislative recognition...
accorded to the capacity of minors to participate intelligently in
decisions affecting their lives." '' California's vision is reflected in the
passage of state statutory provisions, providing adolescents with
latitude to consent to mental health treatment without accompanying
consent by a parent or legal guardian. Pennsylvania's pronouncement
on the issue is exemplary, stating that "[a]ny person 14 years or older
who believes that he is in need of treatment and substantially
understands the nature of voluntary treatment may submit himself to
examination and treatment, provided that the decision to do so is
made voluntarily."8 The societal catalyst behind passage of the
Pennsylvania and other similar state provisions parallels the public
policy underscoring the lack of proscription on adolescents to obtain
drug and alcohol counseling and treatment without consent of a
parent or guardian. In light of the sobering statistical indices of
283. Kathleen M. Quinn & Barbara J. Weiner, Legal Rights of Children, in LEGAL
ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 309, 323 (Barbara A. Weiner & Robert M. Wettstein
eds., 1993).
284. 569 P.2d 1286, 1292 n.4 (Cal. 1977) (en banc). The court retroactively applied its
ruling to adolescents then confined in state hospitals, affording relief and release through
habeas corpus, should the hearing officer determine that the adolescent was "not gravely
disabled or dangerous to himself or others." Id& at 1298.
285. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (West Supp. 2000). See Report of an Invitational
Conference Sponsored by the American Academy of Pediatrics, Section on Adolescent
Health, 105 PEDIATRICS 906 (2000) (reporting that "[b]etween 14% and 25% of
adolescents have a mental health disorder associated with at least minimum impairment").
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soaring adolescent suicides' and deaths resulting from eating
disorders, anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa,2 state legislators
have been wont to ensure easily accessible avenues to adolescents
prior to the onset of a serious condition or untimely death.
The law's evolving stance regarding adolescents and mental
health treatment is the focus of an informative article authored by
Richard E. Redding, which carefully canvasses state law and
thoughtfully discusses the status of children and adolescents within
the mental health regime.' Seeking to maximize the involvement of
both children and adolescents in therapy with an opportunity for
treatment consent commensurate with their capacity, Dr. Redding
proposes both a standard and statutory scheme for civil commitment,
out-patient psychopharmacological treatment, and out-patient
psychotherapy.m Reviewing literature indicating the mature
capabilities of adolescents in decision-making, Dr. Redding's
proposed standard incorporates a preference that maturity be
determined by an independent clinician with specialized training,
rather than by a judge and, consequently, conserve the expenditure of
administrative and economical energy.' In so doing, Dr. Redding
issues an adamant appeal: "Let us not as a society limit unnecessarily
the freedom of our children to develop and exercise their decision
making capabilities, to obtain needed treatment [confidentially], and
to refuse treatment when it may be harmful to their personhood and
individuality."2'
According to Dr. Gary Melton, public policy should start "with a
premise of respect for personhood and, therefore, privacy and
286. See Committee on Adolescence, American Academy of Pediatrics, Suicide and
Suicide Attempts in Adolescents, 105 PEDIATRICS 871 (2000) (citing statistics indicating the
dramatic increase in adolescent suicide, which "is the third leading cause of death for
adolescents 15 to 19 years old" and advancing both reasons and recommendations for
pediatric intervention).
287. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 539-50 (4th ed. 1994). See also Lexcen &
Reppucci, supra note 16, at 100-02 (discussing the psychopathology and effects of eating
disorders on adolescents); Rebecca Dresser, Feeding the Hungry Artists: Legal Issues in
Treating Anorexia Nervosa, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 297, 371-73 (1984) (urging more desirable
statutory and judicial approaches for anorexic adolescents).
288. See generally Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed
Consent for Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 695 (1993).
289. See id. at 739-52.
290. Id at 739, 750.
291. Il at 751.
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autonomy." Proposing a Model Act for the Mental Health
Treatment of Minors, he asserts that "most older minors are
sufficiently competent to make informed decisions to seek or refuse
mental health treatment" and that "persons under the age of majority
have the fundamental right" to make those decisions.'z Based upon
research focusing on the competence of adolescents, Dr. Melton
advances that ensuring adolescent "access to reasonably good care
while avoiding unnecessary intrusion into their lives" is an
"achievable" task.' 4
Regardless of thoughtful proposals by Drs. Gary Melton and
Richard Redding, federal Constitutional guidelines established by the
United States Supreme Court in the aftermath of In re Roger S.
remain stagnant and uninformed. Parham v. J.R. involved a Georgia
statutory procedure, whereby an adolescent may be involuntarily
civilly committed to a mental health institution with the consent of
one parent (even when the minor had been removed by state action
from the parent) along with an evaluation of a mental health
professional at the commitment facility.295 Given the gravity of social
stigma and loss of liberty wrought by institutionalization, the case was
presented to the Supreme Court as a class action due process
challenge. The Court sustained the state procedure as
constitutionally sound under the Fourteenth Amendment.29
However, the fragile framework on which the Court constructs its
reasoning and result is troubling and is comparable to a house of
cards from which the ever so delicate removal of one card may cause
utter collapse. In ruling that any additional safeguards-like an
administrative judge, hearing, and heightened evidentiary standard
accorded to adults in the identical situation-were not
constitutionally required, the Court referred to "mythical fact"
without the benefit of evidence regarding adolescent decisional
ability, family relationships, state intervention, and mental health
292. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 149.
293. Id. at 164.
294. Id. at 6.
295. 442 U.S. 584,588 n.3 (1979).
296. See id. at 587, 620. For illumination of psychiatric admission rates for adolescents
through empirical examination, contending that the "use of hospitalization to manage a
population for whom such intervention is typically inappropriate," see Lois A. Weithorn,
Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission
Rates, 40 STAN. L. REv. 773,773-74 (1988).
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procedures, thereby constituting a somewhat distorted judgment
about the reality of each.2 As several authors explain,
[t]he assumptions seem to start from a concept of the proper
ordering of child, family and state, and then to rest on an illogical
inference that empirical reality matches these ideals-that parents
are motivated always by "natural bonds of affection"... and that
practice in the public mental health system is efficient, competent
... and deserving of deference.m
Gail Perry and Dr. Melton have conscientiously parsed the Parham
opinion, revealing the "unjudicious use of judicial notice" of social
fact, with questionable veracity whose dubious factual assumptions
and empirical speculations "build a link between the case and
constitutional principles where none exist without reference to
reality."2 9 The lasting legacy is that the high Court is poised "to
propel these facts into subsequent case law and, therefore, a spiral of
less than rational legal policy making."' As presaged by Perry and
Melton, a federal district court in Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone
Hospital Authority refused to allow 16-year-old Gregory Novak to
refuse treatment. The court did not consider either the issue of
adolescent decisional capacity or, specifically, Gregory's level of
decisional capacity; instead, the court merely quoted Parham's
declaration that "[m]ost children, even in adolescence are simply not
able to make sound judgments concerning... their need for medical
care or treatment."'
While the Supreme Court in Parham sought to prevent the
erection of obstacles to the treatment process, important safeguards,
such as an administrative hearing could meaningfully involve the
adolescent in a way that would enhance both the adolescent's
understanding and participation in treatment. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court should revisit the issue of adolescent mental health
treatment and commitment with an enlightened analysis that is
receptive to and reliant upon factual evidence.
297. See MELTON ET AL, supra note 7, at 145.
298. Id.
299. Gail S. Perry & Gary B. Melton, Precential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts:
Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633, 644-45, 675 (1983-84).
300. Id. at 645.
301. Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1575 (N.D.
Ga. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)). See
supra notes 218-226 and accompanying text.
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(4) Therapeutic and Nontherapeutic Donation and Experimentation
Providing erudite examination of the value of human life within
the context of scientific experimentation, Professor Guido Calibresi
explains:
[I]t indicates that there is a deep conflict between our fundamental
need constantly to reaffirm our belief in the sanctity of life and our
practical placing of some values.., above an individual life. That
conflict suggests, at the very least, the need for a quite complex
structuring to enable us sometimes to sacrifice lives, but hardly ever
to do it blatantly and as a society, and above all to allow this
sacrifice only under quite rigorous controls.3
Both human experimentation and donation generate contentious
issues of a moral, ethical, and legal nature, inspiring the "rigorous
controls" and profound conflict envisioned by Professor Calibresi
over thirty years ago. These issues, of course, become even more
confounded when the human subject or donor is an adolescent.
Consent to medical experimentation by a competent adult entails
an informed and voluntary understanding of the risks and benefits
involved. This understanding may be shrouded by the reality that a
clinical trial may or may not pose therapeutic measures for the
participant. Desperation due to a medical diagnosis may cloud the
participant's judgment in decision-making as a last chance for
prolonging life, and subtle forms of coercion lurk when a treating
physician is also the investigator with personal and professional
interests of his own.' Rigorous regulatory controls governing the use
of human beings in scientific experimentation, from the Nuremberg
Code and Declaration of Helsinki to federal law establishing
Institutional Review Boards, reflect the atrocities of history that
maligned a most precious commodity-the dignity of human life.'
Reflecting on the "dark era of Nazi experimentation" in a powerfully
moving forward to The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code:
Human Rights in Human Experimentation, Elie Wiesel, a survivor of
the horrors of the Holocaust, recalls his "shock" when he realized
that the nonconsensual experimentation of human beings was
302. Guido Calibresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation in Humans, 98
DAEDALUS 387 (1969), reprinted in JAY KATz, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN
BEINGS 178,180 (Paul Freund ed., 1970).
303. Cf Robert D. Truog et al., Is Informed Consent Always Necessary for
Randomized, Controlled Trials, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 804 (1999).
304. See iL at 804.
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spearheaded by highly educated men with Ph.D. and M.D. degrees,
who:
knew how to differentiate between good and evil. Their sense of
reality was impaired. Human beings were not human beings in
their eyes. They were abstractions. This is the legacy of the
Nuremberg Tribunals and the Nuremberg Code. The respect for
human rights... demands that we see persons as unique... ends in
themselves.'
Reflecting on lessons of the past fifty years, Alexander Morgan
Capron observes that the "violation of human rights can arise not
only when dictators give inhumane scientists free rein ... but also
when well-meaning physicians conduct research in a free and
enlightened society. ' Invariably, attention focused on informed
consent from research participants' is underscored by the legal
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services ("DHHS"), which govern experimentation in the United
States. The regulations were established in the 1970's as a response
to this nation's Tuskegee, Willowbrook,' and eugenic legacies that
hover in the shadows of World War II Germany.' The regulations
305. Elie Wiesel, Foreward to THE NAZI DOCrORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION at vi, ix (George J. Annas & Michael A.
Grodin eds., 1992) (emphasis omitted). See also Arthur L. Caplan, If Gene Therapy Is the
Cure, What Is the Disease?, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 128,
140 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (discussing the Nazi eugenics policies
and assessing that "[p]ublic health, not individual therapy, was the driving force behind
the Nazi medicalization of eugenics").
306. Alexander Morgan Capron, Ethical and Human-Rights: Issues in Research on
Mental Disorders That May Affect Decision-Making Capacity, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1430, 1430 (1999). See also Sherman Elias & George J. Annas, Somatic and Germline
Gene Therapy, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES, supra note 305,
at 144 (emphasizing "that human experimentation regulation has a long history, and it is
easy to forget even its basic lessons in the rush to research"). A century ago, medical
experimentation's disregard for humanness and the spirit embraced therein captured the
fascination of French novelist, Gustave Flaubert, in his acclaimed masterpiece, Madame
Bovary.
307. Cf. Robert T. Truog et al., supra note 303, at 806 (asserting that "blind insistence
on informed consent is not only unnecessary but also harmful").
308. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 333-34, 519-22 for a discussion of
egregious experimentation episodes during the twentieth century. See also David J.
Rothman, Were Tuskegee and Willowbrook 'Studies in Nature?', 12 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 5 (1982).
309. Reference to America's "appalling history of court permitted sterilisations based
upon eugenic theories" was remarked upon by Australian High Court Justice Alistair
Nicholson to the First World Congress on Family Law and Children's Rights in Sydney,
Australia in 1993. See David Tait et al., Legal Regulation of Sterilsation: The Role of
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not only require informed consent, but provide sanctions for
noncompliance." ' The regulations also require research institutions
to establish Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs") that are assigned
to protect research participants and approve only those research
protocols that ensure voluntary informed consent, including the
ability of participants to withdraw at any time and a detailed
calculation of risk and benefits."' In 1983, DHHS promulgated
regulations specifically governing the use of minor participants in
experimentation.
Remarkably, these regulations distinguish therapeutic from
nontherapeutic, consent from assent, and degree of risk entailed, such
as minimal to minor increment over minimal; yet none demarcate age
nor delineate adolescent research subjects in terms of decisional
capacity.312 The regulations merely refer to "minor research subjects."
Even enlightened commentators like Robert Levine, who hails
federal policy as "how we ought to treat children as individuals and as
a class of persons,"3"3 presumes, like the regulations themselves, a
"limited autonomy" of all minor research subjects.3"4 This lack of
Guardianship Tribunals in NSW and Victoria, 8 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 1, 47 (1994). See also
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding Virginia's compulsory sterilization
statute, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes infamously proclaimed "[ilt is better for all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind... Three generations of imbeciles are enough").
310. That the legacies of human experimentation throughout the twentieth century,
along with the moral and ethical issues embraced therein, find expression in medical, legal,
and ethical literature indicates the heightened sensitivity to using people for scientific
purposes. See, e.g., Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1354, 1360 (1966) (exhorting that "[a]n experiment is ethical or not at its inception;
it does not become ethical post hoc-ends do not justify means. There is no ethical
distinction between ends and means").
311. Of course, there are questions about whether the actual practices of IRBs mirror
the specifications and purposes of the regulations. Describing the potential flaws plaguing
the IRB system, Dr. Capron conveys the conclusions of the DHHS inspector general: "the
IRB system is in jeopardy because the local boards are overworked, they fail to oversee
approved studies, their members lack sufficient training, and they face inherent conflicts of
interest." Capron, supra note 306, at 1431.
312. Part 97, Protection of Human Subjects, subpart D Additional Protections for
Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (1999).
313. Robert J. Levine, Children as Research Subjects, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH
CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 73, 85 (Loretta M. Koppelman & John. C. Moskop
eds., 1989).
314. Id. See also ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH (2d ed. 1986).
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attention devoted 'to adolescent decisional ability, accompanied by
presumptive incapacity, exhibits a measure of lesser respect for the
persons of research subjects that seem to belie the spirit of the
regulations and the historical atrocities to which the consent
requirements are aimed.
Paradoxically, informed consent for (not by) adolescent research
subjects expressly specifies consent from a parent or legal guardian.
The guidelines require at least one parent's consent for therapeutic
experimentation; the research subject may physiologically benefit
from the clinical trial, which must pose no more than minimal risk to
the minor subject. If the research project is not therapeutic, then
permission from both parents is necessary, unless exceptional
circumstances exist and the research participation does not present
more than minimal risk. If there are minor increments above minimal
risk, the regulations delegate to the IRB the determination of
whether the procedure presents risks to subjects that are reasonably
commensurate with those inherent in actual or expected medical,
psychological, or social situations, and is likely to yield general
knowledge about the subject's disorder or condition.315 According to
Dr. Capron, the minor increase over minimal risk requirement "is just
the camel's head and neck following the nose of 'minimal risk' into
the tent," essentially allowing an imposition of greater risks and
burdens on sick children than healthy ones. 16
Commentary on the regulations have ranged from focusing on
the ill-defined "minimal risk" to the dual meaning of "assent." Citing
to evidence "suggesting that people tailor their notion of minimal risk
to fit preconceived ideas about what kind of studies should be done,"
one commentator has described "minimal risk" as a "disastrous
315. See Part 97, Protection of Human Subjects, subpart D Additional Protections for
Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-.406 (1999).
316. Capron, supra note 306, at 1433. Minimal risk is defined as follows: "given the
probability and magnitude, the risk is not greater than risks encountered in daily life or
during the performance of routine physical or psychological tests." Id In the event of
"minor increment above minimal risk," the regulatory definition is devoid of clarity, other
than delegating the determination to the IRB. Benjamin Freedman et al., In Loco
Parentis: Minimal Risk as an Ethical Threshold for Research Upon Children, 23 HASTINGS
CENTER REp. 13, 14-15, 18-19 (1993) (characterizing 'minimal risk' as "relational, context-
dependent" and concluding that 'minor increment above minimal risk' represents "a
categorical judgment" dependent upon "fuzzy social consensus").
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central concept" that is "vague and problematic," and concludes that
other risk standards "are no less flawed.,
317
As to "assent," the term euphemistically describes the agreement
by an adolescent who is thought to lack capacity. The term rightfully
invokes a degree of disdain and skepticism from researchers,
particularly those whose research involves adolescent subjects,
because it connotes mere acquiescence to a parent's consent.
Intuitively, the obtainment of assent from an adolescent research
subject does not seem sufficient, especially if the adolescent is
decisionally capable. Under the regulations, the IRB is delegated the
task of determining whether adolescents are "capable of assenting,"
not consenting.38 This requirement of assent from an adolescent
research participant raises a residual coercive dynamic when a
pediatric researcher, however subtly, seeks to obtain agreement from
an adolescent to a parent's decision. Additionally, assent in this
context may even contradict its primary connotation of "passive
acquiescence" or "going along with," as Professor Angela Holder
elaborates:
For example, a twenty-five-year-old competent person gives
consent to a medical researcher to withdraw a blood sample. An
intelligent twelve-year-old may understand just as clearly why the
researcher wishes to withdraw the blood, realize just as completely
that it will produce momentary discomfort and may wish, just as
actively, to agree. Because the legal system holds that children as a
class and without regard to individual capacity to understand are
ruled incapable of consent, the twelve-year-old's agreement is
termed "assent." 319
The complement of regulatory requirements, while attempting to
exhibit respect for young research subjects, would be immensely
improved with a provision tailored toward adolescent decisional
ability. In other words, the parental consent/minor assent dichotomy
prevalent throughout the regulations omits adolescent autonomy in a
way that undercuts the important sense of self-esteem adolescents
receive when their choices and decisions are respected. Even beyond
317. Loretta M. Koppelman, When Is the Risk Minimal Enough for Children to Be
Research Subjects?, in CHILDREN AND HEALTH CARE: MORAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES 89,
98 (Loretta M. Koppelman & John C. Moskop eds., 1989). See also Leonard H. Glantz,
Research with Children, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 238-41 (1998) (providing examples to
explain precisely why "the estimation of risk is difficult to ascertain").
318. Children Involved as Subjects in Research, supra note 312, at 46.404-.406.
319. Holder, supra note 193, at 155.
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the profound issue of personal respect, the requirement of assent
from adolescents generates confusion in clinical practice by actually
inviting problems of coercion and manipulation. In the end, labeling
an adolescent's involvement as "assent" may be utterly meaningless
because it serves only to ease that which is otherwise thought
unconscionable-nonconsensual research and disrespect for persons.
That law and ethics bristle at nonconsensual medical experimentation
is understandable, but the barrier placed before adolescents who are
themselves capable of consenting to research is bewildering.
Moreover, recognition of an adolescent's altruistic desire to
participate in medical research is notably absent from the regulations.
This raises complex situations. Consider a 16-year-old who
participates in a medical study of leukemia determinants with more
than minimal risk. Suppose this particular adolescent is uniquely
poised to participate because she suffered with the disease and is now
in remission. Further, suppose that she understands the risks, but
nonetheless chooses to participate purely in the hope of alleviating
the suffering of others stricken with the disease and wishes to
contribute to the medical science that she believes saved her life.
Most researchers may agree that her decision should command both
respect and deference due to the challenges she has confronted and
her courage in overcoming them. And, for many adolescents,
altruistic participation may be therapeutic in a measure beyond mere
science.
This scenario presents multiple levels of important moral, ethical,
and legal issues. On one level the issue is whether she is decisionally
capable of participation and, if so, would her consent be adequate?
Then, must a parent or legal guardian assent to her consent? What if
parental assent is not forthcoming; what if a parent or legal guardian
objects? On a second level, if she is deemed capable of informed
consent, then what about the determination of risk, especially the
minor increment over minimal risk (recall that the regulations are
predicated on the premise that adolescents lack decisional capacity)?
Should that determination rest solely with the IRB or should it be
placed within the scope of her assessment? Finally, should anyone,
whether a researcher, parent, or the IRB, deprive her of the personal
fulfillment of altruistic participation. Recall also that dignity and
humanity are at the heart of heightened informed consent
requirements, derived from the historic atrocities in nonconsensual
human research from the past century alone.
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The lack of regulatory attention devoted to adolescent autonomy
in medical experimentation, including a dearth of decisional law, has
spawned scathing commentary that draws stark comparisons between
babysitting and participation in medical research. The commentary
punctuates the perplexity that occurs when adults accept that
adolescents are "mature enough to supervise younger children in
extremely dangerous situations," yet judge them "too immature to
consent to research."' Several commentators conclude:
[O]ur analysis uncovers deep inconsistencies in society's perception
of a child's maturity with respect to participation in research, as
compared to assuming the role of a babysitter. The data suggest
that contemporary ethical standards may be divorced from reality
and, as a result, deprive minors of important rights. A new look is
needed at the ability of minors to consent to research which
presently cannot be performed without parental consent, as much
of the advance in adolescent medicine will have to stem from
research conducted with this age group.32'
Consequently, consent issues related to autonomy and adolescence,
intensified by research participation, are unsettling and present a
virtual minefield of explosive issues warranting revision.
Issues regarding genetic testing are interrelated with the issues
surrounding medical experimentation. However interwoven, genetic
testing raises separate issues. Sequencing the human genome has
made possible tests "to discern predisposition to a number of
genetically influenced disorders," such as polycystic kidney disease or
cystic fibrosis.' Such testing may offer immediate medical benefits,
provide information for reproductive decisions, allow access to
intimate information for well-being and identity, or be done merely to
provide genetic information to benefit others.3" While there may be
advantages to genetic testing for personal life planning and
therapeutic measures, many physicians, geneticists, and ethicists
identify the risks or disadvantages of testing to include harm to self-
concept, familial relations, guilt, and stigmatization. Issues with
320. Gideon Koren et al., Maturity of Children to Consent to Medical Research: The
Babysitter Test, 19 J. MED. ETHICS 142,146-47 (1993).
321. Id. at 147.
322. Tamar Lewin, Boom in Genetic Testing Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2000, at Al. See Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Genetic Testing for Children and Adolescents:
Who Decides, 272 JAMA 875, 875 (1994).
323. See id.
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respect to genetic testing are especially thorny when an adolescent
attempts to obtain genetic testing.
As with other areas of burgeoning biotechnology, there is an
absence of concise legal guidance although a consensus of ethical
standards is emerging among physicians. Due to unresolved issues at
the bioethical-legal interface and adverse psychological and
psychosocial effects, the informed consent process for genetic testing
poses special challenges for adults; for adolescents, of course, the
main concern is capacity. Even in states that statutorily recognize
mature minor decisional capacity for medical or therapeutic
treatment, there is a question whether genetic testing may be defined
as medical or therapeutic treatment for consent purposes. If so, there
is also a question about whether to provide counselors to adolescents
seeking access to genetic screening. In addition to the negative
effects of genetic testing and concerns for confidentiality, the ethical
concept of autonomy is profoundly implicated. As Professor George
J. Annas advances, "[a]utonomy requires that all screening programs
be voluntary, and that consent to them is sought only after full
information concerning the implication of a positive finding is
disclosed and understood." 34 Disclosure of information should be
discussed, but not in a manner tantamount to a "genetic Miranda
warning."'  Furthermore, an adolescent possessing decisional
capacity should be able to give informed consent and, like adults,
benefit from prescreening educational material and a support
network of trusted family members, friends, and a professional
counselor. Autonomy for consent to genetic testing should likewise
extend to adolescent parents making decisions on behalf of their
infants and young children.
Less common, but no less important, is the situation in which an
adolescent wishes to donate an organ or tissue to either a relative or
324. George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, The Major Social Policy Issues Raised by the
Human Genome Project, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 3, 7
(George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992). See also Joanna H. Fanos, Developmental
Tasks of Childhood and Adolescence: Implications of Genetic Testing, 71 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 22, 27 (1997) (recommending genetic counseling as a requisite for thoughtful
decision-making when either an adolescent seeks to be tested or a parent requests testing
for an adolescent). See also Julia Binedell et al., Huntington's Disease Predictive Testing:
The Case for an Assessment Approach to Requests from Adolescents, 33 J. MED.
GENETICS 912, 912 (1996).
325. Ruth Macklin, Privacy and Control of Genetic Information, in GENE MAPPING:
USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 164 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992).
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friend in need of it. Donation, though perhaps multi-motivational, is
conceptually altruistic since no one may be compelled to donate an
organ or tissue, either during life or after death. The National Organ
Transplant Act, along with the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and
concomitant state laws neither address nor allude to adolescents. 6
And, professional guidelines and institutional policies inspire
contention rather than consensus regarding informed consent for
adolescent donation.
Legal cases addressing the specific issues entailed by donation
are sparse. Worthy of remark is Hart v. Brown, wherein a dying 8-
year-old suffered from hemolytic uremic syndrome and required a
healthy kidney for survival.'v Katheleen, the ailing child, had an
identical twin sister, Margaret, who "agreed" to undergo the risks of
surgery and give one of her healthy kidneys to her sister. Captivating
about the case is that it was really not a case or controversy at all; all
interested parties including Margaret, her parents, the physicians,
clergy, guardian ad litem, and members of the hospital ethics
committee agreed that Margaret's "consent" was informed, that
psychological benefits would accrue to her in this context, and that
subjecting this healthy child to a risky procedure with long-term
consequences did not violate principles of biomedical ethics. And so,
the court also agreed that Margaret could be subjected to surgical
removal of her kidney.' z Highlighting the physiological risks to
Margaret, coupled with the psychological, altruistic benefit of
donation, the Superior Court of Connecticut accorded weight to
Margaret's consent "insofar as she may be capable of understanding
she desires to donate her kidney so that her sister may return to
her."'29 Especially within a familial context, subtle dynamics affecting
sibling and parent-child bonds may border on pressure, coercion, or
retributive reprisal. The court did not delve into the deeper
psychological effects when hearing testimony from a psychiatrist who
examined Margaret, a clergyman, and court-appointed guardian ad
326. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (1991 & Supp. 2000);
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. §§ 1-7 (1993 & Supp. 2000).
327. 289 A.2d 386, 387-88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972). Hemolytic uremic syndrome "is a
disorder of the kidneys with clots within the small blood vessels" with "no known etiology
and is prevalent primarily in young children." Id- at 388.
328. See id. at 391.
329. Id. at 389. For an array of perspectives regarding parental decision to subject a
child to "altruistic donation," see Linda Delany et al., Altruism by Proxy: Volunteering
Children for Bone Marrow Donation, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 240,240-42 (1996).
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litem, all of whom merely conferred in the decision that Margaret
wished to be a kidney donor for her sister.
Evidently, donation of vital organs differs in risk and kind from
blood, tissue, or marrow donation; nevertheless, it seems clear that an
adolescent aged 14 or older should be able to make that decision,
even in a situation fraught with controversy so long as the adolescent
understands the risks and appreciates the consequences.
Accordingly, the irresponsive state of the law deprives them of
dignity in decision-making by "present[ing] a level of paternalism
toward adolescents [that] is unnecessarily high." '331
(5) Procreative Choice
Passionate dissension will always accompany issues related to
abortion, and now the ubiquity of reproductive technologies is fueling
the flames of discourse regarding procreative choice. With issues
ranging from sperm and egg donation to multiple births as a result of
fertility drugs332 to conceiving a child posthumously from the gametes
of a deceased person,3 33 the process for human reproduction has been
redefined and is replete with moral, ethical, social, and legal issues.
Adolescents wishing to donate genetic material presents legal
dilemmas relating to decisional autonomy. For instance, global use of
the Internet exposes adolescents to advertisements seeking eggs for in
vitro fertilization. The advertisements usually specify certain physical
attributes and intellectual traits and offer ample financial
remuneration. Even if a particular advertisement soliciting genetic
330. Discussions with transplant surgeons at the Thomas E. Starzl Transplant Institute
in Pittsburgh further entrench that conclusion with anecdotal evidence. See also Jennifer
K. Robbennolt et al., Advancing the Rights of Children and Adolescents to be Altruistic:
Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 213, 237-45 (1994-95) (proposing a
legal standard for allowing donation by minors that is a hybrid of substituted judgment
and best interests).
331. Edward P. Mulvey & Faith L. Peeples, Are Disturbed and Normal Adolescents
Equally Competent to Make Decisions About Mental Health Treatments, 20 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 273,274 (1996).
332. See generally Egbert R. te Velde & Bernard J. Cohlen, The Management of
Infertility, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 224 (1999).
333. For a carefully considered view of post-mortem procreation and a proposal for an
intent-based model, see Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising From the Dead: Challenges of
Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 908 (1997) (asserting that "the right to
avoid becoming a biological parent should generally be respected after death as it is in
life,... infringing upon this interest constitutes a serious violation of an individual's
procreative liberty").
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material restricts the age of the potential donor, adolescent
involvement is not altogether preventable due to the void of federal
and state regulation of reproductive assistance and technology."l
Questions related to adolescent autonomy and procreative practices
do merit consideration. For example, does a 17-year-old woman
wishing to sell her genetic material with the assistance of a brokerage
firm, such as Creating Families Inc., possess the capability to
understand and be held responsible for her decision? Should she be
able to give informed consent for the prescribed ingestion of fertility
drugs and the surgical removal of her eggs, both of which pose
substantial risk? In addition, should she be able to become a party to
and be legally bound by a contractual arrangement that essentially
bargains away her potential "motherhood" rights for the quidpro quo
of a specified amount of money? Conversely, should the adolescent
be able to advertise her attractive physical traits, athletic prowess, and
intellectual acumen for profit or even altruistic donative desire on the
Internet or elsewhere?335 Or, in the event of illness, should an
adolescent be able to choose cryopreservation of her gametes for
later procreative use, either for herself or for someone else?
Moreover, in discussions with physicians who practice adolescent
medicine, questions regarding adolescent decision-making for
contraception and abortion seem to generate the most concern and
controversy. Ethically, physicians recognize that even very young
adolescents are engaging in sexual activity, and they wish to provide
both counseling and contraceptives to protect their patients from
334. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretative Approach
to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARv. L. REv. 835, 920 (2000) (reviewing
various approaches to the legal determination of parentage vis-a-vis procreative practices
and proposing an interpretative model that would "base potential status on current family
policy and widely shared public values instead of the circumstances of the child's
conception"); Alexander Morgan Capron, Too Many Parents, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
22, 22 (1998) (recognizing the "countless challenges for the law" generated by assisted
reproduction and the desirability "to craft new legislation that is astute as well as
comprehensive"); Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology:
Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 570 (1994) (recommending "a coherent legal
framework that is comprehensive in scope and sensitive to the ethical and societal impact
of this new reproductive era").
335. For erudite examination of issues related to the commercialization of the human
body and its parts, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE
TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS, AND OTHER THINGS (1996);
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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pregnancy and disease. Although the law allows a pregnant
adolescent to confidentially seek medical advice and treatment
without accompanying consent from a parent or guardian, physicians
are aware of the potential for acrimony in the absence of consent by a
parent or guardian, despite federal law barring the imposition of a
parental consent requirement.33 In practice, most physicians seem to
succumb to concerns for safety and pregnancy prevention of their
youthful patients, viewing the ability of an adolescent to request
contraception as fertility-based, i.e., if the young woman may become
pregnant, she may consent to the use of contraception. This
resolution reverberates with both ethical and legal overtones, as
Professor Angela Holder observes:
It is now clear that an adolescent who requests contraception has a
constitutional right to have it if she is seeking it at a federally
funded facility. A private physician has the right to refuse to
provide it, but he or she may have an obligation to refer her to
Planned Parenthood or a public clinic.'
Once an adolescent becomes pregnant, however, she may then
wish to determine whether to carry the child to birth and whether to
raise and rear the child or consent to the child's adoption. In this
situation, a parent may want an adolescent to undergo an abortion
against her wishes. As Professor Laurence Tribe explains:
[I]f a state is permitted by the Supreme Court to treat all its minor
women and girls as too immature to make this momentous decision
for themselves, physicians might well accede to the decision of a
parent who believes an abortion is in his or her daughter's best
interest. This suggests that parental consent requirements,
whatever might be said for them as a matter of parental authority
generally, cannot plausibly be defended as part of a "pro-life"
compromise since the premises on which such consent
requirements rest equally support parentally compelled abortions.33
336. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (2000) (providing grants for a
"broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services (including
natural family planning methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents)"). See
also Parents United for Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., 148 F.3d 260, 269 (3d. Cir. 1998)
(ruling that school board acted within statutory and regulatory authority when
implementing policy regarding condom distribution and suggesting that state law parental
consent requirements yield to federal confidentiality requirements whenever a minor
seeks contraceptives).
337. Holder, supra note 192, at 3401.
338. TRIBE, supra note 187, at 199.
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While Professor Tribe's explanation is not. without analytical
appeal, it is unlikely that any physician would perform an abortion on
an adolescent who objects to it. Certainly, the same right to privacy
that allows a woman to conclude that she wants an abortion will
protect an adolescent's decision to give birth. It is more likely that
physicians would refuse to subject an unwilling adolescent to an
abortion based on ethical principles, notably patient autonomy,
beneficence, and nonmaleficence. Consequently, as Professor Tribe
acknowledges, "in the absence of a court order, physicians have told
such parents no, and no court has ruled in a reported case that a
parent may force a pregnant child to have an abortion against her
will." ' Physicians should discuss options with adolescents or refer
them to other experienced professionals who would be willing to
provide support by discussing the situation. Indeed, the American
Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Adolescence counsels that
pediatricians and other health professionals "should not allow their
personal beliefs and values to interfere with optimal patient care" and
"need to respect the adolescent's personal decision and her legal right
to continue or to terminate her pregnancy."' Conversely, the
adolescent, herself, may consider terminating the pregnancy, a
decision which is regulated by law. Either way, the enormity of the
decision for an adolescent or adult woman entails profound
implications of a moral, medical, psychological, and personal nature.
Most states specify that an adolescent may choose to undergo an
abortion with the consent of one parent or with the authority of a
judge who will determine whether she may, in fact, be capable of
making this decision and/or whether she adduces evidence that the
procedure would serve her best interests. In a seminal ruling on state
regulation of adolescent access to abortion, the United States
Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird ' evaluated a Massachusetts
provision under the federal Constitution. The provision required that
a minor acquire parental consent or a court order. The case involved
a class action lawsuit initiated by "unmarried minors in Massachusetts
who have adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to
abortion], and who do not wish to involve their parents.''342 The
339. Id.
340. Committee on Adolescence, American Academy of Pediatrics, Counseling the
Adolescent About Pregnancy Options, 101 PEDIATRICS 938, 938 (1998).
341. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
342. Id. at 626.
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Court affirmed the findings by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, invalidating the statute for permitting judicial authority for an
abortion to be witheld from an adolescent, who is found by the lower
court to be decisionally mature, and for requiring parental
consultation or notification in every situation, without affording the
adolescent an opportunity to receive an independent judgment
determining either her maturity or best interests.'
While the result in Bellotti may be a logical extension of privacy
rights analysis in intimate realms of personal decision-making, a close
reading of the Supreme Court's opinion reveals that adolescent
decisional capacity is visibly absent. Indeed, the Court's rationale is
dubious in light of scientific study suggesting adolescent decisional
ability in this context. Rather than framing the issue from the
paradigm of decisional ability, the Court relied upon "peculiar
vulnerability," "inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner," and the important role of parents as reasons to
reinforce presumptive decisional incapacity for adolescents, and that
adolescent constitutional rights cannot be equated with adults.'
Any existing "peculiar vulnerability" probably lies in the Court's
analysis that seems contrary to scientific study of adolescent decision-
making capability, which the Court neither references nor relies upon
in its reasoning." Further, the Court determined that states may
reasonably require parental consultation without infringing
constitutional guarantees because "immature minors often lack the
ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both
immediate and long-range consequences. ' 'M6  However, while
343. See id. at 650-51.
344. Id. at 633-35. Of course, this judicial observation without factual support has not
been reserved for adolescent procreative decision-making. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 849, 870-85 (1997) (striking down provisions of the federal Communications Decency
Act of 1996 aimed at protecting minors in cyberspace on grounds including vagueness and
overbreadth, while retaining the view that minors are 'peculiarly vulnerable').
345. Cf. Gary B. Melton, Judicial Notice of "Facts about Child Development", in
REFORMING THE LAW 232, 239 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987) (observing that the Court
adopts "a curiously narrow vision of minors as vulnerable to all sorts of threats-except
threats to their liberty or privacy" and ignores "the differences between the competency of
adolescents and that of younger minors").
346. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640. Prevailing myths about adolescent risk-taking have been
debunked by researchers, whose studies reveal results contrary to unsubstantiated views
that adolescent risk-taking is mindless, aimless, or mere sensation-seeking. See generally
Rita Shapiro et al., Risk-Taking Patterns of Female Adolescents: What They Do and Why,
21 J. ADOLESCENCE 143, 157 (1998). Researchers have further found, when comparing
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consultation with any trusted adult would be desirable, the Court
assumes adolescents in this situation are immature and unable to
make informed choices, despite evidence indicating otherwise. These
judicial assumptions are especially problematic when the Supreme
Court engages in social fact finding because "the highest Court is in
the peculiar position to impart credibility to those social facts it
adopts," increasing the likelihood of lower court reliance and
acceptance?24  Because judicial notice of social fact lacks the
safeguard of review, there is no opportunity to correct the lack of
validity of those assumptions. As several commentators aver:
[These] statements of social "fact" can become underlying tenets of
the law, regardless of their empirical reality. When these
judgments of reality are in fact misguided or uninformed, the result
can be a succession of irrational decision making. This danger is
perhaps particularly pernicious when social facts are judicially
noticed. In such an instance, there is no opportunity in the first
place to refute what may be erroneous or inapposite perceptions of
social reality. Potential influence on subsequent decisions
compounds the risk.
In the aftermath of Bellotti, the Supreme Court, to some extent,
tempered its assumptions regarding adolescents, recognizing that
minors and their circumstances may vary substantially, thereby
adolescents and adults, that risk-taking of adolescents did not exceed that of adults,
reporting that "invulnerability is no more pronounced among adolescents than adults" and
is no more characteristic of adolescents than adults. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence
Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences of Adolescent Decision-Making, 68
TEMP. L. REv. 1763, 1768 (1995); Marilyn Jacobs Quadiel et al., Adolescent
[In]Vulnerability, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102, 113-14 (1993). Likewise, Dr. Paul Trad of
the Cornell University Medical Center examined adolescent decision-making, concluding
that adolescents "do not engage in significantly more risks than adults." Paul V. Trad, The
Ability of Adolescents to Predict Future Outcome, Part I: Assessing Predictive Abilities, 28
ADOLESCENCE 533, 550 (1993). According to Dr. Trad, adolescents simply may possess a
"different conception of risky behavior" with "decision-making skills [that] differ from
those of adults." Id.
347. Perry & Melton, supra note 299.
348. Id. at 635-36. Using as their paradigm the Supreme Court's decision in Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), wherein the Court upheld as constitutionally valid a Georgia
statute permitting the involuntary civil commitment of a minor to a mental health
institution requiring only the consent of one parent coupled with an independent medical
evaluation, Gail S. Perry and Gary B. Melton skillfully scour the opinion, finding "no
fewer than 15 empirical assumptions" about family relationships and the mental health
profession many of which were "directly contrary to existing social science research about
the psychology and sociology of these institutions." Id See supra notes 295-300 and
accompanying text.
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eschewing "absolute rules" that "create an inflexibility that would
allow for no consideration of [their] rights and interests." 9 Deciding
the facial constitutionality of a Utah law, the Supreme Court in H.L.
v. Matheso3 50 upheld a statute requiring a physician to notify, if
possible, the parents or guardian prior to performing an abortion on a
minor, which was reaffirmed in Hodgson v. Minnesota.1 and Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health. 2 In support of its holding
that Utah's restriction on the scope of adolescent decision-making
regarding abortion "serves important state interests, is narrowly
drawn to protect those interests, and does not violate any guarantees
of the Constitution,"'353 the Court specifically found the statute
"reasonably calculated to protect minors by enhancing the potential
for parental consultation concerning a decision that has potentially
traumatic and permanent consequences."354
Following Bellotti and Matheson, many states enacted or revised
statutes providing for parental involvement, including Pennsylvania,
which amended its Abortion Control Act in 1982 to provide for the
consent of one parent, coupled with a judicial bypass option should
the minor not obtain a parent's consent. 5 Challenged under the
federal Constitution, the provision was scrutinized by the Supreme
Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3  The Supreme Court
declared the provision a reasonable restriction on an adolescent's
349. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,420 (1981).
350. Id.
351. 497 U.S. 417 (1989) (upholding two parent notice requirement with judicial bypass
provision and 48-hour waiting period as constitutional despite due process and equal
protection challenges).
352. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). Adhering to statutory protection of adolescents with parental
notice requirements, the Court found statutes in Ohio and Montana "constitutionally
indistinguishable"-the former allowing a court to waive parental notice should a juvenile
judge determine by clear and convincing evidence that an abortion would be in an
adolescent's best interest and the latter providing for judicial waiver of notice, should a
juvenile court judge find that such notice would not be in an adolescent's best interest-
and declared the laws valid. lId at 508; see also Lampert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292,297-98
(1997).
353. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 412.
354. Id For a critical commentary of the Court's conclusions, see Burneatta Bridge,
Comment, Parent Versus Child. H.L. v. Matheson and the New Abortion Litigation, 1982
WIs. L. REV. 75, 76-98, 115 (offering an historical analysis of the Court's treatment of
minors' procreative choices and arguing that state interests underlying parental
notification statutes are insufficient and should be deemed "constitutionally unsound").
355. Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3201 et seq. (1983 &
Supp. 2000).
356. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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right by affording the "parents of a pregnant young woman the
opportunity to consult with her in private, and to discuss the
consequences of her decision in the context of the values and moral
or religious principles of their family."'3
Although the role of family or counselors may be significant in
acclimating an adolescent to decisions about her pregnancy,358 the
Court in Casey, as in Bellotti, Matheson, Hodgson, and Akron, neither
analyzes nor even addresses adolescent decisional ability. This failure
by the Court perpetuates a legal presumption that adolescents lack
competency for decision-making. Researchers Bruce Ambuel and
Julian Rappaport rebut the presumption by studying a population of
104 adolescents faced with unplanned pregnancy decisions through
questionnaire and an in vivo structured interview.59 Specifically, they
examined, using psychological variables relevant to legal policy,
young women's competency to consent in the emotive setting of
unintended pregnancy, compared this population with adults, and
analyzed their actual decision-making process."6 The researchers
357. Id. at 899-900 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990)). The
"undue burden" standard of Casey has prompted passage of statutes in several states that
impose tort liability on health care providers who perform abortions on adolescents
without parental consent. One commentator posits that such legislation creates an
unconstitutional chilling effect on the willingness of providers to perform abortions on
minors and, therefore, constitutes an undue burden on the right of an adolescent to obtain
an abortion. See Pammela S. Quinn, Note, Preserving Minors' Rights After Casey: The
New 'Battlefield' of Negligence and Strict Liability Statutes, 49 DuKE L.J. 297, 320-30
(1999). For an examination of county court handling of Pennsylvania's judicial bypass
option to the parental consent requirement and an assertion that county courts' "lack of
readiness poses a real and substantial threat to the rights of Pennsylvania minors," see
Helena Silverstein, Road Close& Evaluating the Judicial Bypass Provision of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, 24 L. SOC. INQUIRY 73, 74 (1999).
358. See Comm. on Adolescence, American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 340, at
939 (advancing that adolescents should "seek the advice and counsel of adults in whom
they have confidence, including other relatives, counselors, teachers, or clergy" if parent
support is neither possible nor forthcoming). See also Beier et al., supra note 13, at 331
(maintaining that "connectiveness with a trusted adult makes a positive contribution to the
life, development, and behaviors of an adolescent"); Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 123
F.3d 849, 855 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that "[o]rdinary parents, loving and sensitive, want
to share in their daughter's upbringing, to alleviate her anguish and fears, and care for
her"). For an expansive perspective on the role of family and its import to individual
decision-making, see generally Mark G. Kuczewski, Reconceiving the Family: The Process
of Consent in Medical Decisionmaking, 26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (1996).
359. See Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 129,
134-39 (1992).
360. See id. at 133.
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report that adolescents aged "14 to 17 appear to be similar to legal
adults in both cognitive competence and volition" ' 1 and that they
"remain competent decision makers when facing an emotionally
challenging real world decision."362  They further report that
adolescents often consult with adults when making monumental
personal decisions, and that state mandates, such as parental
notification and consent, pose serious risk for adolescents.3 The
researchers suggest that the law configure procedures to maximize
legal competency, "by enhancing participatory decision-making,
giving adequate information about all available options, facilitating,
as appropriate, minors' already extensive use of peer and family
social support, and providing resources for additional information,
expertise, and social support." '' Paradoxically, their suggestion is
strengthened by the Court's observation in Bellotti that "the mere
existence of a legal right" does not realistically provide "an effective
avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most." '
Despite scientific studies suggesting decisional ability of
adolescents in the abortion realm, state high courts have nonetheless
rendered varying decisions under state constitutions. In re T.W.,
decided by the Florida Supreme Court, established that a parental
consent statute unduly infringes an adolescent's privacy under Article
I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution.6 Characterizing the
decision about pregnancy as closely paralleling the intimate decisions
concerning one's body in medical care generally, the Florida Supreme
Court extended the state constitutional privacy right to minors,
absent the government's ability to proffer a compelling interest to
justify infringement.3 67
Sharing Florida's penchant for guaranteeing constitutional rights
beyond those of the federal Constitution, California has also
extended privacy rights in procreative decision-making to adolescents
361. Id at 148.
362. Id
363. See id at 151.
364. Id
365. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 645 (1979). See also Preston A. Britner et al.,
Evaluating Juveniles' Competence to Make Abortion Decisions: How Social Science Can
Inform the Law, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 36 (1998) (providing a
comprehensive discussion of how "psychological and family systems research can inform
decision-making and the law with regard to minors' access to abortion").
366. 551 So. 2d 1186, 1188, 1194 (Fla. 1989).
367. See id at 1193-95.
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in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren.' There, the
California Supreme Court invalidated, under Article 1, Section 1 of
the California Constitution, a statutory provision requiring an
pregnant minor to secure parental consent or judicial authorization
before she may obtain an abortion. Widely casting the net of state
constitutional protection, the California high court characterized the
right to intimate decision-making as "the most fundamental of all
constitutional rights," thereby requiring the state to establish a
compelling interest to justify its abridgment? 9 Further determining
that the stature of the privacy right is not mitigated by minority status,
the court was not persuaded by the state's interest in preserving the
health and welfare of the minor nor by its interest in fostering parent
and adolescent unity 7'
Legal commentary on the California Supreme Court's decision in
Lungren has suggested that counseling outside the family may further
the state parens patriae interest while preventing undue interference
with adolescent privacy rights, directing law makers to "consider the
minor's health, safety, and welfare to determine who will be most
helpful in assisting children in making the difficult decision about
what to do if they become pregnant."37' However, the suggestion that
counseling be a function of the state, rather than the family, lacks
consensus among those in the medical community. As one physician
scoffed: "[r]emoving from the parents counseling a minor about
abortion and allowing counseling to become a public function strikes
a devastating blow to family structure and the traditional passage of
morality from parent to child. 31
Offering another distinct perspective, Bruce Ambuel and Julian
Rappaport emphasize that the choice of trusted consult belongs to the
adolescent herself, which may provide a greater measure of assistance
to the adolescent as she considers her circumstances and struggles for
a solution.37 Of course, at the very heart beats the notion that an
adolescent (or any woman) may benefit from trusted and confidential
368. 940 P.2d. 797, 800, 818-19, 831 (Cal. 1997).
369. Id. at 819.
370. See id,
371. Jennifer R. Kramer, Note, Adolescents, Abortion, and Amendments: Choices After
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 33 U.S.F. L. REv., 133,136,152 (1998).
372. Letter to the Editor, Parental Consent for Abortion, 269 JAMA 2210 (May 5, 1993)
(Kevin E. Glancy).
373. See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 359, at 150-51.
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consultation with a family member or friend, or avail herself of
professional or pastoral counsel. The benefit derived from such
counsel may include the autonomous choice of the adolescent
concerning the source for the counsel. Accordingly, it should not be
incumbent upon the state to dictate the nature of counsel through
parental consent and notification statutes.
Emphasizing the importance of social support but rejecting both
the reasoning and results in T.W. and Lungren, the Mississippi
Supreme Court in Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice upheld the state
parental consent statute, requiring adolescents to secure the consent
of both parents, with exceptions,374 prior to having an abortion.
Finding the state constitutional privacy right to embrace an implied
right to chose whether to terminate a pregnancy, the state high court
departed from T.W. and Lungren, distinguishing the express
guarantees of privacy in the Florida and California Constitutions
from the "inferred right" found in the Mississippi Constitution." The
Mississippi Supreme Court opted for the undue burden standard of
Casey for reviewing an intrusion of state constitutional privacy, rather
than the heightened compelling interest test, and found Mississippi's
two-parent consent law not unduly burdensome.76
Like the United States Supreme Court, these state supreme
courts fail to consider evidentiary data that challenge the tenet that
adolescents, by mere virtue of age and experience, lack a degree of
maturity to make momentous decisions.' A reason may be the
omission by the attorneys representing the parties to develop and
effectively present the issue before the trial court and, thereafter,
brief and argue it on appeal. As discussed earlier, a failure of counsel
to raise the issue of adolescent decisional ability may violate ethical
374. 716 So. 2d 645, 655-56, 666 (Miss. 1998). Specifically, Mississippi requires "an
unemancipated minor to obtain consent of both parents or the approval of the chancery
court before obtaining an abortion," unless the minor's parents are divorced, unmarried,
or separated, one of the parents is unavailable within a reasonable time and manner, or
the pregnancy is the result of sexual and/or incestual abuse, whereby the written consent
of one parent is justified. Medical emergency excuses any written parental consent. See
id. at 656 (quoting MISS ANN. CODE §§ 41-41-51 to 41-41-63 (1993)).
375. See Fordice, 716 So. 2d at 659.
376. See id. at 660.
377. See Maggie O'Shaughnesy, Note, The Worst of Both Worlds?: Parental
Involvement Requirements and the Privacy Rights of Mature Minors, 57 OHIO ST. L.J.
1731, 1750-65 (1996) (relying on empirical research for the proposition that young women
are generally mature enough to make pregnancy decisions and urging the courts to revisit
the parental involvement statutes).
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canons of professional competence or implicate tortious substandard
practice.
Moreover, in Matheson, the Supreme Court was careful "not [to]
suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give
effective consent for termination of pregnancy," finding "no logical
relationship between the capacity to become pregnant and the
capacity for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an
abortion."3 8 However, not only does the Court neglect to define what
it means by "mature judgment" or cite to psychiatric or psychological
study that may provide guidance, its singular observation about
"mature judgment" is not peculiar to adolescents and is equally
applicable to adult women facing a similar decision." Burneatta
Bridge highlights the "unsettled and unsettling" questions raised by
Matheson and its progeny-specifically, the standards to be applied
by courts to determine whether a minor is mature for purposes of
possible exemptions from parental consent and notification
requirements, and whether the requirements will be upheld for
mature minors.' These questions remain unanswered by the Court.
Remarkably, Ms. Bridge's commentary regarding adolescent abortion
is as true today as it was in 1982 when she published her article: "a
minor facing an abortion decision is currently presumed to lack the
capacity to make responsible decisions, and unless she can convince a
judge or administrative officer that she should be allowed to make the
decision independently, the state can require that her parents be
involved.""1  Her legal commentary amplifies the impoverished
attention accorded adolescent decisional ability, reminding one of the
adage 'as much as things change, they remain the same.'
HI. Adolescent Autonomy-A Model for Reform
An adolescent autonomy model recognizes decisional ability, as
opposed to decisional incapacity. The United States Congress is
empowered to enact enabling legislation that could establish a
separate area of the law for adolescents apart from that governing
younger children, due to the discerning ability of adolescents and
accoutrement of distinctive concerns. Such enabling legislation
378. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,408 (1981).
379. Id.
380. Bridge, supra note 354, at 115.
381. Id at 100.
August 2000] AIDOLESCENT AUTONOMY
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
should direct the states to comport with an adolescent autonomy
model, while providing states the freedom to fashion laws balanced
with sovereign needs and concerns regarding the scope and extent of
adolescent decision-making in various contexts.' Indeed, Congress
has navigated national policy concerning other distinct segments of
the population, such as the Older Americans Act, the Patient Self-
Determination Act, and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Reform Act, each directing the states to pass comprehensive
legislation consistent with and in furtherance of national policy.'
Congress' constitutional authority to commandeer state
legislatures to comply with an adolescent autonomy model has
several potential bases. One basis may be found in the Commerce
Clause, as an enumerated power contained in Article I, Section 8,' in
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause that endows
Congress with authority to make laws necessary and proper for
executing Article I powers." The Supreme Court acknowledged in
Alden v. Maine Congress' broad power under Article I, Section 8 to
enact legislation that binds the states without having to satisfy a test
of undue incursion into state sovereignty, authorizing Congress to
impose requirements on the states that are generally applicable for
facilitating Congress' regulation of interstate commerce. Although
under current Commerce Clause regulation the Court has raised
questions concerning the extent to which Congress may enact social
382. Notably, states would retain ability to style laws for a plethora of contexts,
including the purchase of cigarettes, firearm possession, alcohol consumption, and driver
licenses. Curfews that circumscribe liberty, however, may continue to pose constitutional
challenge. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944-46, 952 (9th Cir. 1997)
(striking down juvenile curfew ordinance on grounds inter alia of equal protection,
invoking a strict scrutiny analysis). But see Schleifer v. City of Charlotteville, 159 F.3d 843,
847, 852 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999) (upholding juvenile curfew
ordinance, employing intermediate scrutiny to determine that the ordinance substantially
relates to important government interests, while also finding that "it would survive even
strict scrutiny if that were the appropriate standard of review").
383. See Older Americans Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1994 & Supp. 2000); Patient Self-
Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1992 & Supp. 2000); Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1995 & Supp. 2000).
384. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.").
385. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution.").
386. 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999).
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legislation to safeguard individual rights, the Court has nonetheless
reaffirmed the considerable latitude enjoyed by Congress when
exercising commerce power. In United States v. Morrison, the Court
reinforced that Congress may regulate pursuant to commerce power
for the protection of "persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." As
discussed throughout this Article, compelling issues attendant to
adolescent fights, along with the disenfranchising and aggregate
damaging effect that presumptive decisional inability has on
adolescence, are pervasive and require a national, rather than a local,
response. Another basis to support Congressional action concerning
adolescence may be found in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which mandates the "power to enforce by appropriate
legislation" the guarantees of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.' Congress, then, arguably has a proper constitutional basis
for enacting enabling legislation of this genre and furthering the vital
role reserved to the states by the constitutional design. Prior to
Congressional action, a President's Commission for the Study of
Adolescence should be appointed and convened to examine legal and
social issues impacting adolescents; this would represent a significant
step toward shaping Capitol Hill policy debates.
Furthermore, federal and state legislation based upon an
adolescent autonomy model would not eviscerate parens patriae, but
would revolutionize it in a way that effectively comports with the
reality of adolescence. In other words, parens patriae should evolve
responsively to social norms that assume adolescent decisional ability.
Notably, Dr. Gary Melton expressed a decade ago within the context
of juvenile delinquency that the tenets and spirit of In re Gault should
be reconsidered and reevaluated to "implement procedures
consistent with meaningful justice for youth."3" The same may be
said about the doctrine of parens patriae. An adolescent autonomy
model would allow the states to guide the development and promote
the welfare of adolescents while furthering responsibility. Therefore,
law based on such a model would effectively govern adolescence,
387. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1754-59 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
388. 120 S. Ct. at 1749.
389. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
390. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB.
L. REV. 146, 181 (1989).
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ensuring individual development into and throughout adulthood, and
eliminate ethereal rules and erratic results that now blight legal
governance of adolescents, from juvenile delinquency to health care
to family law. That public policy should evolve to address the distinct
decisional issues attendant to adolescents finds expression in myriad
laws governing family affairs generally, including laws permitting
termination of parental rights and prosecution for child abuse and
maltreatment. Public policy should likewise evolve to embody
adolescent decisional ability, which is supported by scientific evidence
and developmental research. Indeed, national policy reflected
through state law would effectively resolve adolescent issues without
disrupting the role of important institutions in the lives of
adolescents, including family, and preserve a distinctive juvenile
justice system.
Commentary has disparaged, discredited and debased the
juvenile justice system; however, reports of its demise are rather
premature. Though generating thoughtful discourse, such
commentary is devoid of resolution, with some notable exception.
Calling for the abolition of juvenile court jurisdiction, Professor Janet
A. Ainsworth invokes "social constructivist theory" to conclude that a
separate juvenile court system contravenes current cultural and
historical context.39' She reasons, "we can no longer justify
maintaining a procedurally and practically inferior justice system for
juveniles [because] our interpretive construct of childhood and
adolescence has changed, and we no longer view young people as
essentially and uniformly different from adults."3" Other
commentators, like Professor Donald L. Beschle, have explored the
discordance within the legal system, where recognition "for
adolescent autonomy in a wide range of non-criminal justice contexts
clashes with a commitment to a more paternalistic, rehabilitative
approach to juvenile crime as compared with adult crime," though
reticent toward "a consistent position of respect for adolescent
autonomy.""'
While I very much agree with Professor Beschle's observation
that "[t]o simply disregard the dissonance created by inconsistent
391. Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083,1085-90,1133 (1991).
392. Id. at 1132. See also Janet Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response
to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1995).
393. Beschle, supra note 156, at 105.
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treatment of adolescent autonomy would be to ignore something
significant,"3" I think the time is especially appropriate to establish
explicitly what the law has been embracing implicitly-adolescent
decisional ability. However, recognizing adolescent decisional ability
does not preclude state guidance for developing autonomous rights
that preserves parens patriae as foundational. And, while I
wholeheartedly agree with Professor Ainsworth's assessment that
"our interpretive construct of childhood and adolescence has
changed," I depart from her proposal to abolish the system. The
same social constructivist reasoning employed by Professor
Ainsworth to conclude that changes in the nature of adolescence
"undermine the ideological legitimacy of a separate juvenile court
system" '395 normatively and descriptively may be used to advance an
adolescent autonomy model that reflects the social reality of these
changes, yet maintains parens patriae of state power to assist in the
meaningful development of adolescent decisional issues. Indeed,
parens patriae, as the basis for juvenile jurisdiction, promotes
benevolence toward others, and no commentator has persuasively
argued that it should not be preserved for adolescents.396
394. Id. at 103.
395. Ainsworth, supra note 391, at 1084.
396. See Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 375,
375, 398 (summarizing the "wave of proposals for reform of the juvenile justice system"
and suggesting that attention should be devoted to "an adequate social welfare system that
provides, at the very least, a minimally decent standard of living for all families"). See also
Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does Not Roll
Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533,534,539-52 (1998) (exploring arguments for
abolition of the system and explaining its "remarkable resilien[ce]" for survival); Elizabeth
S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective
on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 153-72 (1997) (focusing
on influential factors affecting juvenile justice reform); Gary B. Melton, Children,
Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2041, 2047 (1993)
(maintaining that emphasis should be placed on a "responsive justice system" that
"educates the citizenry in the core social values and their significance for everyday life").
See also Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best
Interests of Children, 33 NEw ENG. L. REv. 39, 70-80 (1998); NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE STATES 1994-96
(1997); Ainsworth, supra note 392; Robert 0. Dawson, The Future of Juvenile Justice: Is It
Time to Abolish the System, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136, 145-51 (1990); Sanford J.
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1231-39
(1970). For law review and journal devotion to symposia inquiring "Will the Juvenile
Court Survive" and focusing on "The Future of the Juvenile Court", see 564 ANNALS AM.




These proposals fall short of considering the core issue of
decisional capability and apply only superficial balm to soothe the
irascibility of the governing law. Offering an international
perspective, Professor Jane Fortin rightly recognizes that adolescents
"like other minority groups... are affected by various branches of
law, all with their own distinctive character, with no particular
coherence or similarity in policy or objectives" and eloquently
observes:
Our society quite obviously values well educated adults with highly
developed critical faculties and powers of initiative, who are able to
take responsibility for their own lives. These are the qualities that
the United Kingdom should encourage its adolescents to develop,
since they require their "dry run" at adulthood. When fulfilling
their rights therefore, attention must be given to promoting their
decision-making abilities, through treating them with respect and
consulting them whenever possible. At the same time, it is unlikely
that adolescents who have been brought up to develop these
qualities, and like their parents, to value autonomy, will respond
well to being treated without any powers of initiative, whenever it
suits society."
Indeed, recognition in 1970 by the Chairman of the White House
Conference on Children of the pronounced differences between
adolescence and childhood presage an adolescent autonomy model,
as young people aged 14 through 24 have become "more and more
concerned with what was once considered adult domain of public
affairs, while children still live in their own special world."3  An
adolescent autonomy model would unite disparities existing in
current law, elucidate firm precedent for clear and uniform guidance,
and promote the development of adolescent rights. Roscoe Pound
once declared that "the legal order must be flexible as well as
stable."3'9 A legal model predicated on adolescent decisional ability
would accomplish just that.
397. JANE FORTIN, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING LAW 472 (1998).
398. VEERMAN, supra note 62, at 255.
399. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923). Dr. Pound
explains: "[The legal order] must be overhauled continually to the changes in the actual
life which it is to govern. If we seek principles, we must seek principles of change no less
than principles of stability." IL Similar sentiment about the stability and elasticity of law
within constitutional context was expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall: "We must
never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. State of
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,407 (1819).
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Conclusion
In 1978, a report, prepared for the United States Senate by the
American Law Division of the Library of Congress, projected that an
ad hoc approach to adolescent rights "is likely to accord additional
rights consistent with the recognition that they do in fact lack the
capacity of adults" and that "a fairly high standard of justice and
fairness can be attained even in the absence of a unifying theory." '
Both projections have proved eristic and erroneous. As this Article
discusses, the legal approach to adolescents, which has been based on
presumptive decisional incapacity, has resulted in discombobulated
rules lacking any clear, concise framework for effective governance.
Most problematic is that this presumption of decisional incapacity
reduces recognition for legal rights, disabling any meaningful exercise
of them. It is distinctly at odds with social norms and scientific
assessment of adolescent capability.
Adolescent decisional ability should direct the law to optimize
personal development, individual dignity, and respect for adolescent
expression of values. That scientific research quantitatively suggests
capability for autonomous decision-making underscores qualitative
calculation that adolescents are involved in decision-making to a
larger extent than presently presumed by law."°  A legal model
embracing adolescent decisional ability would comport with both
quantitative and qualitative measurement and accommodate
adolescent issues in a way that would improve vastly the kaleidoscope
approach and variegated outcomes. Accordingly, such a legal model
would ensure a suitable measure of stability and predictability in the
law governing adolescence.
In his distinguished work, The Changing Legal World of
Adolescence, Franklin E. Zimring queries, "why not the eighteenth
birthday as a presumptive age of majority... unless there is a very
good reason not to."' This Article attempts to present very good
reasons. Injustice has been adduced by adherence to presumptive
incapacity, resulting in injustice not only for adolescents but also for
adults interacting with them, as the areas of medical care and contract
400. AMERICAN LAW DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE
UNITED STATES LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
(Wash. D.C. 1978).
401. See Brock, supra note 188, at 181.
402. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 111-
12 (1982).
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law illustrate. Moreover, the laws governing juvenile delinquency
raise concerns of fundamental fairness, generating deeply rooted
issues of justice as well as issues of professional responsibility and
advocacy for attorneys representing adolescents. The current legal
approach with its disengaged connection to adolescent decisional
ability is vulnerable to constitutional challenge, especially when the
legal presumption of incapacity appears unrelated to social and
scientific fact.
To date, proposed legal reform has been either cosmetic or
radical, rather than restructuring legal framework to recognize
adolescent decisional ability. The proposed model discussed in this
Article embraces social reality and would be responsive to resolving
issues related to adolescence, with clarity and cohesive guidance. It
also cultivates the deeper promise of adolescent independent thought
and identity. This legal model encourages the establishment of a
President's Commission for the Study of Adolescence as an important
initial step toward thorough examination of adolescent issues, and
entails Congress' recognition of adolescence as a distinct legal
category. This recognition should lead to the passage of federal
legislation enabling states to style laws that address adolescent
autonomy, including the scope and extent of adolescent decision-
making in various contexts, while preserving parens patriae. No less
intense is that this proposal revolutionizes the juvenile justice system
in a way that retains its special distinction, recognizes the enormous
value of family and social institutions in the lives of adolescents, and
optimizes adolescent freedom for personal development.
Indisputably, one's sense of identity and autonomy should not depend
on the capricious, archaic demarcation of a birthday; rather, it is a
life-long journey that, as Dr. Jean Piaget determined, develops
cognitively from childhood and continues through adolescence and
into adult life. The twenty-first century should be a dawning for an
enlightened view of adolescent autonomy, rather than a mythical age
of majority, whereby one is suddenly endowed with decisional ability,
the import of which is poignantly punctuated by the timeless
reflection of William Butler Yeats-"I whispered, 'I am too young,'
And then, 'I am old enough."'"
403. William B. Yeats, Brown Penny, in THE COLLECrED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 98
(2d ed. Richard J. Finneran ed., 1996).
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